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lN7RODUC1JON 
The region today referred to as the Middle East bas always interested the 
greatest world empires. From the times of Alexander the Great through those of the 
Roman Empire, the Arab expansion, the Mongols, the Ottomans, and indeed right up 
to the present, this area at the crossroads of three continents bas drawn the attention and 
interference of foreign peoples. Some of them came to conquer, others simply to pass 
through on their way to other locales, but all considered the area in some way 
important to their imperial and/or commercial goals and aspirations. 
Conquerors and traders have continued to influence Middle Eastern history, 
with the English in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries often encompassing both 
roles. Great Britain's concern with the region originally sprang from the desire to keep 
open the shipping lanes to its most prized possession -- India. However, the British 
went beyond a strictly maritime function and colonized or "protected" much of the 
Middle East, even until the early 19705. This tradition of subjugation and imperialism 
created deep feelings of resentment among the peoples of the region over several 
centuries. These emotions heavily contributed to the development of organizations 
such as the League of Arab States and, in the volatile Gulf region, the Cooperation 
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. 
The latter organization, commonly referred to as the Gulf Cooperation Council 
or the GeC, consists of the independent states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. The GeC's 1981 charter expresses one 
of the group's primary purposes: " •••to strengthen their cooperation and reinforce their 
common links.•. for a better future on the path to unity of [the member] states"1 Such 
a venture towani unity obviously requires movement in the direction of joint self· 
defense mechanisms, allowing freedom from outside intervention in the case of attack 
from a non·GCC state. Although the Council was not created specifically as a regional 
defense organization, and in fact the Charter does not mention any joint defense 
requirements, a collective security system has been discussed since the early days of the 
GCC and bas recently become one of the hottest topics of debate at organimional 
meetings. Such collective security under GeC auspices was obviously absent in the 
19805, as the United States Navy entered the Gulf to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers, and 
especially in 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait with no formidable military response 
from the other members of the GeC. 
These examples highlight the need for an examination of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council's prospects for providing Gulf security in the future. The stated goals of 
several member ~tes, following the humiliating Kuwaiti invasion, include the creation 
of a credible self-defense force as a means of preventing Gulf affairs from requiring 
outside intervention. Some GeC member states see the best road to these aims as 
further integration and cooperation among themselves in the military and political 
arenas. However, several obstacles hinder efforts toward increased collaboration and 
political unity. These include outstanding territorial and border disputes within the 
GCC. The tension surrounding the undefined Saudi-Qatari border, for example, led to 
armed conflict between these two member states in October 1992. In addition, 
domestic sovereignty concerns similar to those expressed by members of the European 
Community and other regional organizations stand finnly in the way of smooth and 
unchallenged unification of the countries in the Council. 
'Ibis project concerns itself with these issues - the factors leading toward Gulf 
unity and those seemingly precluding the possibility. Through intensive research of 
existing literature on the GeC (such as books, magazines, newspapers, and journal 
articles) in addition to archival material and original primary sources, this paper brings 
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the history of the Gulf and the realities of the present situation together to determine the 
chances of peace and stability in the area under the direction of a GeC-sponsored 
regional security system. 
The paper is divided into major topic areas, each building upon the last in 
progression towards an analysis of GeC regional security prospects. The first section, 
entitled The Member States, gives a brief overview of each of the states in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council. This chapter serves two purposes: 1) informing the reader about 
the history and development of each member state; and 2) allowing for better 
understanding of the comparative politics and social structures of the GeC countries 
(and the impacts of these upon Gulf integration efforts). The Evolution of Gulf 
Cooperation follows, chronicling the stimuli for the creation of the GeC and 
explaining the formation and structure of the organization itself. The next section, The 
GCe Through ~e IraD-Inq War, discusses the ways in which the GeC interacted 
with Iran and Iraq during the 1980-88 war, in terms of threat analysis, mediation 
efforts, and the advantages, if any, the GeC provided for its members during this 
crucial period. Even more important to the GeC was the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by 
Iraq and the subsequent Coalition attack on Iraq, covered in The 1990-91 Gulf War. 
This chapter focuses upon the failure of the GeC in its collective security function and 
provides the details of the war itself -- why outside intervention was necessary along 
with a brief description of the war's progression. The Impacts of the Gulf War takes 
this a step further and analyzes physical, social, and political impacts of the war on the 
GeC states in addition to identifying lessons learned by the GeC as an organization. 
The paper concludes with Prospects for Gulf Security, which examines the Council at 
this pivotal time when calls for further integration and closer cooperation are being 
challenged by continued intra-member disputes and traditional concerns over 
sovereignty. 
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THE MEMBER STATES 
Saudi AraJ.M 
Saudi Arabia is by far the largest of the Gulf Cooperation Council's member 
states. Geographically, the Kingdom holds over four-fifths of the Arabian Peninsula, 
an area the size of the United States east of the Mississippi, under its jurisdiction. 
Bordering countries are Jordan to the northwest, Iraq and Kuwait to the northeast, 
Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman to the east, and Yemen to the southwest. 
Major regions include the Hijaz, lying along the Red Sea and containing the holy cities 
of Mecca and M~ in addition to the commercial center of Jidda; Najd, the central 
heartland of the Arabs in which lies the country's capital, Riyadh; AI Hasa (the Eastem 
Province), containing a large Shia population and most of the Saudi oil fields; and 
Am, a mountainous, fairly lush region bordering Yemen. In terms of population, 
Saudi Arabia again ovenhadows its neighbors. The Kingdom claims to have some 
twelve million inhabitants, four million of which are expatriates. Islam is the state 
religion and central cultural influence on all aspects of life in the nation. The "puritan" 
Wahhabi sect, derived from the conservative Hanbali school of the Sunni branch, 
prevails throughout the Saudi state, with the exception of AI Hasa where Shi'ism plays 
a large role. 1 
Saudi Arabia's modem history begins with the cbaacter of Muhammad ibn 
Abdul Wahhab, an eighteenth century conservative Sunni preacher who emphasized the 
unity of God (fa whid} and the sin of idolatry in any form. His"conversion" of and 
alliance with Muhammad ibn Saud, the ruler of a nearby town, gave him the strength 
in arms be needed to spread his message across Najd. By 1804, the Wabbabi-Saudi 
..
 
. i 
union, sealed by intermarriages and Saudi family belief in the Wahbabi message, 
controlled most of present--day Saudi Arabia, including Mecca and Medina.2 The 
Ottoman Sultan claimed to be Protector of the Holy Places and took offense at the 
limitations the Wahhabis were putting on Ottoman citizens making the hajj. An 
Egyptian anny, by order of the Sultan, was sent to crush the young state. The 
Wahhabis were decimated by 1811 and the survivors were sent back to their original 
lands in central Arabia. 3 
The Wahhabis rose again in the mid-nineteenth century only to be repulsed by 
the Ottoman-affiliated AI Rashid clan of northern Arabia. However, a young scion of 
the House of Saud, Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rahman, began the third and (so far) final 
rise of the Saudis when he defeated the AI Rashid at Riyadh in 1902.4 Also known as 
Ibn Saud, he conquered all of the regions in the modern state by 1926 and unified the 
territories into ~ Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. The nature of the conquests, 
mostly relying upon shifting alliances with nomad tribes, contributed to non-definition 
of borders which even now gives rise to heated debate between the states of the 
peninsula.5 
King Abdul Aziz's successor Saud came to power in 1953 and along with the 
subsequent kings (Faisa11964-75, Kahlid 1975-82, and Fahd 1982-present) represents 
the importance of the state's founder -- they are all his sons.6 Power in the country 
gravitates around the descendents of Abdul Aziz and those of his father, Abdul 
Rahman. Nearly all of the top positions in government, ranging from ministers in 
almost all fields to governors of the various regions of the country are held by AI Saud 
members. The decision making process involves not simply the whim of the king as 
many Westerners perceive. The family's centuries of experience with tribal hierarchy 
bas made councils of the leading figures in the family, including not only many sons of 
Abdul Aziz but also members of other AI Saud branches, the major method of policy 
formulation. Consensus among the family remains important even in the modern 
s 
administration. If the Icing's actions bring disfavor from his kin, he may experience a 
fate similar to King Saud and be removed from power and replaced by a more capable 
ruler.7 
These rulers have overseen the transformation of Saudi Arabia from a 
traditional, bedouin society into one dominated by oil wealth and modernization efforts. 
Discovered in 1936, oil in the Kingdom now amounts to some 168 billion barrels of 
recoverable reserves, the largest such soun:e in the world. 8 The country leads the 
world in oil exports, and relies upon this one product for sixty percent of government 
revenues. Almost all Saudi oil is produced by the Arabian American Oil Company 
(ARAMCO) for the government, creating a large U.S. presence in the nation and 
explaining the West's close ties to the Saudi royal family. The 19705 saw a rise in oil 
prices which made the Kingdom very rich very quickly, but the glut of the 1980s 
forced the Saudis to scale back many projects and realize the limits of "black gold" 
power. Development plans have made the infrastructure, health and educational 
facilities, and industry in Saudi Arabia among the best in the Middle East.9 
Because of its large population, vast geographical domain, control over the holy 
cities of Islam, and incredible oil wealth, the Kingdom stands out as the "fint among 
equals" in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Outside observers typically view the 
organization as Saudi-eentered; this is not wholly inaccurate, although overly 
simplistic. Events such as the 1992 Saudi-Qatari border dispute and its resolutionlO 
illustrate the fact that the Saudis do not dominate their neighbors to the extent that 
many Westerners believe. 
Kuwait 
Kuwait lies at the northwestern tip of the Gulf between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. 
The emirate, slightly smaller than the state of New Jersey, is for all intents and 
purposes a city-state. The capital, Kuwait, controls the best harbor in the entire 
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Gulf. ll A 1987 estimate put the population at over two million, of which only about 
700,000 were Kuwaitis (the rest being expatriates, mostly low-skill workers from 
Palestine and the poorer nations of the Middle East and Asia). 12 The overwhelming 
majority of the inhabitants are Muslims, with citizens almost exclusively so. About 
fifteen percent of the overall populace adheres to Shi'ite Islam, while the larger 
percentage has adopted the Sunni tradition, with emphasis (like the Saudis) on the 
conservative Hanbali school of jurisprudence.13 
The current ruling dynasty, the AI Sabah, came to the area from central Arabia 
in the eighteenth century as part of the larger Utub tribal migration. This tribe was an 
extension of the huge Anaiza tribal confederation, from which also derive the AI Saud 
rulers in Saudi Arabia and the AI Khalifah of Bahrain. 14 The excellent harbor at 
Kuwait contributed to the Utub tribe's success in Gulf trade and helped make the 
Kuwaitis prosperous throughout the rest of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
The AI Sabah emerged as the unchallenged authority in Kuwait by the 17701 and 
managed to keep the city-state autonomous through all of its history by engaging in a 
system of constantly shifting alliances with local powers, namely the Ottomans, and 
foreigners such as the British. In 1871, the AI Sabah accepted formal Ottoman 
protection although the Turks never sent any personnel to the emirate. IS However, 
this association set the stage for future Iraqi claims to Kuwait (see especially the section 
entitled The 1990-91 Gulf War). A violent palace coup brought M~ referred to 
as "the Great," to power in 1896. He changed Kuwaiti foreign policy and in 1899 
signed a treaty with Great Britain making their representatives the only foreigners 
Kuwait would receive -- in exchange for British protection from the Ottomans and 
Ottoman allies in northern Arabia. Britain continued to play an important role in 
Kuwait for many years, including the negotiation of the 1922 AI Uqair border treaty 
with the Saudis. 16 
7 
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Oil became an important factor in Kuwait upon the discovery in 1938 of large
•

quantities in the Burgan field, since identified as one of the world's largest sources. 
• 
The English, of course, supervised the Kuwaiti oil industry through its creation and 
early stages. 17 However, by 1961, Kuwait no longer felt the need for the 1899 
agreement and on June 19 the British agreed that Kuwait was fully independent. Iraq 
made the first of several claims to Kuwait upon the British departuJe, causing both 
U.K. and Arab League troops to be positioned to defend the city-stale. IS A 
constitution was drafted soon after independence allowing for a representative body to 
be elected in 1963. Although suspended in 1976, the National Assembly illustrated 
Kuwaitis reputation as one of the Gulf's.more democratic states. The Al Sabah's ruling 
position bad traditionally depended upon the constant support of the important 
merchants rather than authoritarianism, making the development of modem Kuwait as 
at least somewhat;democratic by Gulf standards not entirely unexpected. 19 
Kuwait developed its oil sector extensively and became the fint Middle Eastern 
nation to retail oil in Europe. Traditional merchant families were co-opted in the 
modernization process through government incentives for participating in new 
industries such as finance and banking, as well as infrastructure development. For 
example, the majority of a Kuwaiti company's shares must be owned by Kuwaitis, thus 
protecting the interests of the commercial elite.20 The society is marked by a set of 
divisions - the Al Sabah vs. the ruled, the -true,- long-in-residence Kuwaitis vs. 
newer arrivals, men vs. women, Sunni vs. Sma, citizens vs. expatriates - all of which 
create some tension in the country. A basic sense of unity still characterizes Kuwait, 
however, making the city-state unique among Gee member states; perhaps more than 
any other Arab state, Kuwaiti citizens see themselves almost as much as members of a 
state as they see themselves as Arabs.2I 
I 
Bahrain 
The State of Bahrain oonsists of an archipelago of thirty-three islands midway 
between mainland Saudi Arabia and the Qatar Peninsula in the Gulf. Only five of these 
islands are inhabited, however, with the largest called al-Awal or simply Bahrain 
Island22 and being the location of the capital and most populous city, Manama. Like 
most of the Arab Gulf states, Bahrain's population (around 420,000) oontains a large 
percentage of non-citizens - around thirty-three percenL The indigenous population 
derives from Arab and (to a fairly large extent) Persian sources, as opposed to the other 
Gee states which have overwhelming Arab ~orities in their citizenry.23 Islam, the 
predominant religion in Bahrain, serves as a somewhat divisive element. Of the 
240,000 actual Bahraini citizens, some two-thirds follow the Shi'ite tradition with the 
remainder being SunnL The latter have dominated the islands' society for hundreds of 
years, and the c~t ruling family, the AI KhaIifah, most major merchant families, 
and the Arabs associated with the AI Khalifah follow the Sunni branch of Islam. The 
AI KhaIifah adhere to the Maliki school of Islamic law and interpretation, setting them 
apart from the Hanbali-influenced Saudi and Kuwaiti ruling families, although all fall 
under the Sunni umbrella. Most of the Shi' ites in Bahrain conform to wTwelverw 
Shi'ite belief, like the Persians across the Gulf and the population of southern Iraq.24 
Bahrain's modern history may properly begin in the early 18005, when Britain 
developed strong ties with the Gulf, including Bahrain, to protect the shipping lanes to 
India. The islands were governed by the AI Kbalifah family and allied tribal families 
who had migrated to Bahrain from Kuwait and northwest Qatar over the previous 
centuries, wresting sovereignty away from a small Persian garrison which had held 
nominal control for some time. In fact, for much of the 18005, the AI Khalifah held a 
great deal of power in the central Gulf, controlling not only Bahrain and the 
neighboring islands but much of the Qatar Peninsula. This position made them quite 
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noticeable to the British, who by now were interested in making deals to keep the Gulf 
area in order. 
The association between Bahrain and the United Kingdom began in earnest in 
1820 with a "General Treaty" between the AI Khalifah and the East India Company. 
Subsequent agreements followed throughout the nineteenth century, including a 
"Perpetual Treaty of Peace and Friendship· in 1861 and more treaties in 1880 and 
1892.25 The latter two solidified British control over the Gulf by preventing Bahrain 
from entering into any direct relationship with other foreign powers and requiring that 
the English be consulted before any Bahraini territory be used by foreigners. 26 
Oil production began in the mid-1930s, creating new problems -- especially the 
expansion of foreign firms and an increase in resident foreign nationals. Nationalist 
sentiments grew among the Bahraini citizens, within both the Sunni and Shi' ite sectors. 
Strikes and ~c violence characterized Manama during the 19S0s as the clash 
between tradition and modernity continued. The AI Kbalifah appeased the movement 
somewhat with a mild refonn of the system of governmental influence - the richer 
merchants' role in governmental affairs was reduced in exchange for these merchants' 
continued control over, and in many cases monopoly in, most areas of Bahraini 
commerce. The AI Kbalifah expanded its influence over many aspects of daily life, 
and set itself up as a stable and organized government for the country. Britain 
withdrew from the Gulf in 1971, and on August 14 of that year, Bahrain became 
independent with the AI Khalifah in undisputed control.27 This occurred despite 
British pressure for Bahrain (as well as Qatar) to join the seven Trucial States in a 
"Federation of Arab Emirates." Bahrain's original interest in such a union was the 
protection it offered from possible Iranian annexation; the likelihood of such actions 
decreased in 1970 when a U.N. investigation made public the Bahrainis' overwhelming 
desire for an independent sovereign state rather than union with Iran. The lower Gulf 
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states28 did proceed with the federation plan and formed the United Arab Emirates in 
1971, without Bahrain and Qatar.29 
The family continues to bold the most power within Bahraini society. The 
ruling emir is Sheikh lsa ibn Sulman AI Khalifah, and close relatives comprise the 
majority of important posts within Bahrain's cabinet. A council of elden chosen from 
within the family serves the purposes of settling intra-family disputes and balancing the 
interests of the family's several branches. Regarding succession, Bahrain's 1973 
constitution states that unless the ruler chooses otherwise, his eldest son will become 
emir upon the former's death. 
Bahrain's power is not simply a family affair. Other institutions and groups 
have an impact upon politics in the island nation, including the government 
bureaucracy, municipal councils, and powerful businessmen. The state bureaucracy 
grew rapidly in ~ 19505 and 1960s, continued in the immediate post-independence 
yean, then slowed somewhat in the 19805. This large apparatus has impacts on nearly 
all aspects of Bahraini life, ranging from labor issues to security and defense. 
Municipal councils govern the cities and towns at a local level, providing for much of 
the basic services of any community. The commercial elite are generally either 
descendants of traditional rich Bahraini merchant families or those who make money 
from oil enterprises. Some individuals from this wealthy merchant community, 
especially those with long-standing ties to the AI Kbalifah, bold government positions, 
thus blurring the line between the government and business secton of Bahrain.30 
Bahrain stands out with Kuwait among the GCe member slates in the political 
realm for one major reason - it has had elections. On December I, 1972, Bahrainis 
went to the polls to elect representatives for a Constitutional Assembly, engaging in a 
rather democratic election by Gulf standards, albeit with age, sex, and other qualifien 
for voting eligibility. 31 The draft constitution prepared by the Assembly planned for a 
National Assembly, with both elected and appointed memben. Unlike most other Gulf 
11 
nations' plans for consultative bodies, however, this one actually bore fruit. December 
7, 1973 saw another election, and Bahrain's first National Assembly was born. 
Although dissolved in August 1975, the Assembly did engage in real debate on 
substantive issues, such as a law allowing unions and limiting the importation of 
foreign workers. The brief tenure of the body indicated the difficulty of sustaining 
liberal democratic institutions in traditional, autocratic societies, but also showed that 
such consultative groups were not fully incompatible with the Arab Gulf.32 
Qatar 
The small nation of Qatar comprises an area of around 4,400 square miles on 
the peninsula of the same name about midway along the Arab side of the Gulf. The 
only known border is with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; border agreements between 
Qatar, Saudi ~ia, and the United Arab Emirates have not been made public. The 
capital of Doha holds well over tw~thirds of the country's nearly 350,000 people. Oil 
is the primary export, as is true for the other Gulf states, presenting the need for 
foreign expatriate workers. The "native" population is overwhelmingly Arab, with 
some Persian influence, although with less of the latter than the neighboring island 
nation of Bahrain.33 In fact, the only basic characteristic setting Qatar apart from the 
other littoral states is the fact that it has never had any lasting inland settlements, the 
coastal regions having been and continuing to be the lifeblood of the tiny country.34 In 
terms of religious affiliation, Qataris mostly adhere to the Sunni branch of Islam. The 
Shi'ites that do live in the peninsular nation are almost all either of Persian stock or 
Arabs who had migrated to Persia and have returned to the Arab side of the Gulf. The 
Arab Gulf states (Qatar being no exception) have in common, albeit to diverging 
extents, this issue of minority Shi'a populations. 
For centuries before the 1800s, Qatar (with the exception of small coastal 
villages) had generally been of interest to neither local populations nor foreign powers. 
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The AI Khalifah family (now in power in Bahrain) for a time held sway over much of 
the peninsula. But by 1868, the British Political Resident for the Gulf recognized the 
AI Thani tribe as the "legitimate" authority in Qatar. In fact, the British at this time 
worked out an agreement whereby, among many other measures, the AI Khalifah 
would pay the AI Thani fines for violating their rights earlier in the centwy.3S Soon 
thereafter, the Ottomans asserted nominal control over the peninsula, but this 
effectively ended in 1893 when the Qataris successfully fought Ottoman troops. 
Relations grew with the British, and in 1916, the two parties signed an agreement much 
like those tying the other Gulf sheikhdoms to the United Kingdom. There was only 
one major difference in the Qatari treaty - whereas the others guaranteed British 
protection from maritime assaults, the AI Thani received a pledge of help in the case of 
a land attack. 36 
Oil was ~scovered in Qatar in 1939, with large scale production beginning in 
1949. This led not only to increased international attention for the small emirate, but 
also gave rise to questions about the border between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and the, 
ownership of the Hawar islands, just off the west coast of Qatar but claimed by 
Bahrain. Before oil, bedouins would trek across most inland desert areas freely and 
little concern was given to the exact location of borders. However, as oil companies 
required lines on maps for their concession rights, disputes arose. 37 In the case of the 
Saudi-Qatar border, occasional armed conflict continues to this day, as will be 
discussed in a future section.38 
Qatar did not have a sudden and overwhelming oil boom as many other Gulf 
states. Its development has been more sequential and less dramatic. In the political 
arena, the 19605 stood out as a time of consolidation of the power of the AI Thani and 
emergence of structures to serve as a governmental apparatus upon eventual 
independence. The British decision, announced in 1968, to leave the Gulf and move its 
"protectorates" toward independence created a swirl of activity in Qatar. This included 
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movement toward a union of the lower Gulf states, which succeeded in combining 
seven of the sheikhdoms into a new nation-state (eventually becoming the United Arab 
Emirates). Qatar opted out of this union because it had overall friendly relations with 
the Arabian peninsula's dominant power, Saudi Arabia, and thus did not feel that 
security depended upon federation with other emirates.39 On September 3, 1971, the 
State of Qatar became officially independen~ as a sovereign state untied to any other 
Gulf or non-Gulf nations.40 Since this time, the AI Thani has dominated all aspects of 
Qatari society. Members of the clan hold many of,the key positions in government and 
industry. The AI Thani traditionally traded as well as governed; the ruling family 
consequently engages in private enterprise to a greater extent today than, for example, 
the AI Sabah in Kuwait41 Governmental structures have expanded quite a bit since 
independence such that a fairly modem administration supervised by well educated civil 
servants now runs the nation's affairs. 42 
Petroleum production has been Qatar's primary industry, but the country does 
not have reserves nearly as large as many of its neighbors. Gas is looked to as a more 
valuable natural resource to be exploited - over ten percent of the world's proven 
reserves lie in one field in Qatar! The government employs more Qataris than any 
other business in the country, explaining the nation's expansive bureaucracy. 43 Trade 
in the Gulf continues to play a large role in the Qatari economy with long-standing, 
prominent merchants such as the Darwish and the Mani holding enviable positions, 
although competition from more educated, younger Qataris makes their status in the 
future somewhat tenuous. In short, the base of power in Qatar, although still primarily 
in the hands of traditional elites and tribal leaders, is expanding and shifting downwards 
to reach new levels of society.44 
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I.he VDited Arab ;Emiratn 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of the following seven 
emirates of the lower Gulf: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sbarjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, 
Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah. Oman borders the Emirates to their southeast, and a 
border exists with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, although the exact boundary details have not 
been released by the respective governments. The capital and most populous city is 
Abu Dhabi, also the capital of the emirate with the same name.45 The emirates range 
in size from Abu Dhabi's 28,000 square miles to tiny Ajrnan's 150. The geography of 
the UAB is much less monotonous than that of Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, with 
upland plains and mountains adding variety to the coastal plain and desert.46 The UAE 
bas a small (no more than 300,000) citizenry, although the number of residents 
including expatriates is over 1.2 million. Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the most influential 
emirates, have e~y large foreign populations of fellow Arabs, Westerners, and 
(especially in Dubai) Iranians. Almost all residents are Muslims. Elements of 
Christianity and Hinduism exist within the expatriate communities. 
Historically, the UAB's coast has been prime preying ground for Gulf pirates. 
By the 19th century, the British presence in the Gulf had increased to the point whereby 
it could no longer tolerate such piracy; many campaigns struck the pirate hideouts 
along the Gulf s southwestern shores. The sheikhs of the lower Gulf signed treaties 
with the United Kingdom in 1853 creating a "perpetual maritime truce," creating the 
term "Trucial States" for these sheikhdoms.47 The Trucial States agreed to the 
Exclusive Treaty of 1892 which bound the emirs and their successors to the British 
government, giving the latter the right to be the "exclusive" foreign power in the 
sheikhdoms. The British took this keen interest in the Trucial States because of their 
strategic position along the route to India, the Empire's prize.48 
After World War IT, the British continued to be involved in the Trucial States 
despite the loss of India in 1947 and the scaling back of commitments elsewhere. This 
IS
 
continuation of British activity can be explained with one word - oil (discovered in 
Abu Dhabi in 1958 and Dubai in 1966, and to be found in Sharjah in 1972 and Ras al­
Khaimah in 1983). Eventually, as the United Kingdom decided to withdraw from all 
areas east of Suez, it allowed the treaty relationships to end. Hopes were for a union to 
develop with Bahrain and Qatar joining the seven Trucial States, but tenns of a joint 
agreement could not be worked out.49 Bahrain and Qatar opted for independence, 
leaving six of the Trucial States (minus Ras al-Kbaimah, which joined in February 
1972) to declare the independent United Arab Emirates on December 2, 1971. Since 
independence, the major issues in the federation have been handling disputes among the 
emirates, mostly concerning borders, and providing protection against its larger 
neighbors.50 
The government of the UAB is actually very similar to that of the GeC as a 
whole (see The ~volution of Gulf Cooperation). The Supreme Federal Council 
(SFC), made up of the seven emirate rulers, charts policy, elects the President and 
Vice-President, and ratifies federal and international laws and agreements. Legislative 
authority rests in the Council of Ministers. This group initiates most laws, supervises 
the implementation of laws, and proposes the budget for SFC approval. The UAB also 
has a Supreme Court and a Federal National Council. The latter, which makes non­
binding recommendations on draft laws, has its membership allocated on the basis of 
emirate influence and population and is seen as a possible step toward a democratic 
parliament.51 This loose confederation structure has been led since independence by 
President Sheikh Zayed ibn Sultan AI Nuhayyan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, and Vice­
President Sheikh Rashid ibn Said AI Maktum of Dubai.52 
As in the other GeC states, oil has prompted rapid modernization. Reserves are 
large and ensure that the UAB's development will continue well into the twenty-first 
century. To encourage citizen participation in the nation's business activities, a fifty­
one percent local ownership law is in effect.53 Tribes hold some influence in UAB 
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society, but oil has prompted many traditional tribal leaders and members to move 
from the hinterlands to urban areas. Families have taken up some of the slack in 
authority structures, especially seen in the active ruling families of each emirate.54 
The most pressing issue for the UAE is the incredible percentage (over seventy-five 
percent) of expatriates, though no serious threat has been made against the government 
since independence. 
Qman 
Oman is the easternmost of the GeC states, occupying some 82,000 square 
miles on the eastern end of the Arabian Peninsula. The sultanate can be divided into 
three main regions -- historical Oman in the central area, Dhow in the south, and the 
Musandam Peninsula. The Jatter, separated from the rest of the country by the United 
Arab Emirates, juts out into the strategic Straits of Hormuz at the mouth of the Gulf 
and is the only Omani territory actually bordering the Gulf. In addition to the 
Emirates, Oman borders on Yemen to the southwest. The capital, Muscat, lies on th~ 
Gulf of Oman, an extension of the Arabian Sea. The population, never the subject of 
an official census, is estimated at just over 1.3 million.55 Arabs dominate these 
numbers, but several distinct ethnic communities prosper in Oman. The most 
interesting of these are the mysterious Shihuh who populate the Musandam Peninsula -­
perhaps the only true non-Arab indigenous group in the GeC.56 Ibadism, a branch of 
Islam allowing for the election of an imam to be the community's religious leader, 
dominates Oman, although many tribes and ethnic minorities subscribe to a range of 
Sunni and Shi'ite sects. Oman's Ibadism distinguishes the country from its GeC 
neighbors. However, its conservative nature fits in well with the other nations' 
religious leanings.57 
A long tradition of independence, mostly under Ibadi imam rule, exists in 
Oman, dating back (with brief interruptions and civil wars) over a thousand years. By 
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the end of the seventeenth century, the influence of Muscat's rulers had extended along 
the entire eastern coast of Arabia and to East Africa while traditional role by the imams 
had shifted to control by more secular hereditary sultans.58 In 1829, Zanzibar became 
the hub of the Omani state, with Muscat and other Arabian territories becoming 
secondary in importance. Zanzibar and Muscat separated into distinct entities in 1861 
on terms that the former pay the latter 40,000 Maria Theresa (Austrian) dollars as an 
annual tribute. This practice continued until Zanzibar's official independence in 1964. 
Civil wars and intra-Qmani disputes, often over sultanate or imamate successions, 
characterized the country into the twentieth century.59 
Foreigners had approached the area for centuries beginning with the Portuguese 
in 1508. The Turks, Persians, French and British all followed. Treaties of friendship 
and trade were eventually signed with Great Britain and remained in force until 
independence ~ officially recognized in 1951.60 Later in that decade, a dispute over 
succession to the imamate ended with Sultan Said ibn Taimur expanding outwards from 
Muscat eventually taking over all of modern-day Oman and ending the imamate 
altogether. The only major threat to Oman's integrity since has been a rebellion in 
Dhofar (supported by the USSR and Communist China). The uprising began in 1961 
and continued until 1976 when it was quelled by Said's young pro-Western son Qaboos 
(who had become sultan in a 1970 palace coup).61 
The Omani sultans up and through Qaboos have been from the AI Said branch 
of the AI Bu Said tribal grouping. This important family has tended to hold important 
positions (in addition to the sultanate) in the administrationlbureaucracy throughout 
modem times. 62 Sultan Qaboos has overseen a shift of control from solely the sultan 
to a council of ministers and a number of national councils. Officially, Qaboos still 
chairs each of these councils and continues to be the real authority in the country. In 
1981, the State Consultative Council was created as an advisory body to reflect popular 
opIDlon. Its delegates, though appointed by the sultan and in truth powerless, do hold a 
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unique right in the Gulf region -- freedom of speech. Despite this appearance of at 
least some deference to the general public, Qaboos remains the prime minister, defense 
minister, finance minister, and minister of foreign affairs in his own government (in 
addition to being the sultan).63 The state bas increased its authority under Qaboos, 
infringing on the traditional power relationships between tribal chiefs. Although they 
continue to wield a great deal of influence in local affairs, these leaders no longer 
present any challenge to the sultan on a national level.64 The AI Bu Said members, 
particularly descendents of the nineteenth century Sultan Said ibn Sultan, dominates 
upper levels of the government. Some positions in the administrative bureaucracy are 
also filled by the family's business associates and British expatriates.6S 
Oil, the key to the country's economy, is less abundant in Oman than in most of 
the other Gee states. Recoverable reserves are low, with no more than twenty years 
supply left at cux:rent production rates. However, more reserves will most likely be 
found in areas as of yet unexplored. Due to the oil money, education and health care 
have improved markedly. Large scale development in Muscat does not represent the , 
level of advancement in the entire country - many rural areas of the interior have been 
untouched by modernizing influences.66 Other than spreading the benefits of 
modernization to all Omanis, Qaboos faces other challenges such as religious 
opposition and the lack of a named successor. Overall, however, the stability of 
Qaboos and Oman itself seems assured for at least the rest of the century.67 
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THE EVOLU7l0N OF GULF COOPERA1JON •

The Unstable Gulf•
 
The Arab Gulf states collectively sit on some of the most expensive real estate 
in the world. Each of the countries described in the previous section have used their oil 
wealth to quickly bring themselves into the modem era. With this rapid development, 
and the vast reserves of oil still waiting to be tapped, attention has naturally gravitated 
toward the Gulf. Threats abound not only from internal sources but from other nations 
as well. These threats provided the impetus for the creation of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council. 
The 19705 saw the best of times and the worst of times for the Gulf states. 
What we know in the United States as the Oil Crisis of the middle of the decade 
brought a windfall to nations in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), especially to the large producers in the Gulf. Oil prices jumped worldwide, 
and OPEC countries tripled their intake per barrel. In the five year period from 1971 
to 1976, the future members of the GCC saw their combined Gross Domestic Products 
(GDPs) rise from eleven billion dollars to seventy-nine billion dollars. 1 Whereas oil 
had previously provided mostly domestic benefits, in the fonn of infrastructural and 
industrial development, the wealth by the mid-19705 enabled the Gulf Arabs to become 
foreign policy actors of great importance. The influence of "petrodollars" was felt 
throughout the world as saudi Arabia and the sheikhdoms of the Gulf spent their extra 
money on their favorite causes, usually Islamic and Arab ones. In addition to the 
obvious foreign policy value of such aid, it seemed that the Gulf region itself in the 
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19708 was relatively safe. Iran and Iraq, the two largest and most powerful area states, 
were constrained by each other and, in the case of Iran, by the United States. 
By the end of the decade, however, the tide had begun to tum; instability, fear, 
and conflict characterized the region. Britain had long since given up its somewhat 
stabilizing sphere of influence in the Gulf. Iran suffered a revolution which brought 
the Islamic Republic to power under the Ayatollah Khomeini, who espoused 
fundamentalist revolution throughout the Islamic world and beyond. Religious 
militants took over the Grand Mosque in Mecca, resulting in a violent clash with Saudi 
authorities in November 1979. A month later, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, 
drawing criticism not only from the West but also from the Muslim nations of the 
Middle East. Both Iran and Ba'thi Iraq continued to claim territory of the Arab Gulf 
states. Iraq had previously asserted that Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq (see The 
1990-91 Gulf ~ar). Despite publicly relinquishing such claims, Saddam Hussein's 
Iraq still pushed Kuwait for access to the strategic Gulf islands of Bubiyan and Warba. 
Meanwhile, Iran kept control of three small Arab islands near the Straits of Hormuz 
and accused Gulf Arabs of not being "true Muslims."2 Propaganda from the Islamic 
Republic intensified: 
... the Arab governments of the Gulf are friends of the US, 
therefore we do not consider these states as independent, 
nor do we wish to cooperate with them, and Iran intends to 
export its Islamic revolution in support of any Islamic move­
ment that rises against any Arab government. 3 
However, even these comments paled in comparison to the danger presented by 
the onset of the Iran-Iraq War. In September 1980, expecting disarray and confusion 
within Iran's army because of the recent revolutionary purges, Iraq launched a surprise 
air and land attack all along the border. The Iran's superior American weapons left 
over from the Shah's reign could not stop initial Iraqi success. But by early 1981, the 
Iranian ability to obtain plenty of fanatic recruits (to replace heavy battle losses) 
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enabled the Islamic Republic to halt the Iraqi advance and create a virtual stalemate. A 
violent war ensued which eventually involved chemical weapons, missile strikes, and 
hundreds of thousands of deaths. 4 
The Gulf states favored a rapid Iraqi victory. This desire makes perfect sense -­
the fundamentalist Shi'ite threat from Iran was worse than the Ba' tbi government 
currently in power in Iraq. A strengthening of Saddam Hussein, while not welcomed, 
was seen as the better of two evils.S Although Iraqi forces started their surprise 
invasion with incredible success, by the end of 1980 it was clear that no Iraqi victory 
would come soon, if at all. The hopes for Iranian impotence and disorganization were 
dashed when Kuwait itself was attacked by Iranian planes in November 1980.6 
lni.tiBI EfYons at Gulf Cooperation 
The war brought a direct threat to the states along the Gulf. Iran proved that it 
was capable of striking across the Gulf if it so desired. Also, the restive Shi'a 
minorities in the Arab Gulf stales would easily be whipped up into a revolutionary 
fervor if their governments fought alongside Iraq. The alternative - not supporting 
Iraq - was not much better. Leaving the nation of fourteen million (most of whom 
were either Shi'ites themselves or Kurds, who had no love lost for Saddam Hussein) to 
fight by itself against Iran, with over forty million people, would open the Gulf Arabs 
up to charges of abandoning a fellow Arab state. Since the sheikhdoms had given so 
much lip service and "petrodollars" to Arab causes, such a stance would be 
indefensible. Each of the Gulf states faced this dilemma of two bad choices with no 
regional security mechanism to fall back upon. 
But even before the Iran-Iraq War and the security crisis it created in the Gulf, 
the smaller states had taken small steps toward cooperation. The United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), formed in 1971, was the first example of Arab unity becoming more than just a 
phrase. Although Bahrain and Qatar did not join the federation, the very fact that they 
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met with the other small sheikhdoms showed promise for future coordination activities. 
Sultan Qaboos of Oman brought the foreign ministers of Iran, Iraq, and the future GCC 
states to Muscat in 19~6 to consider the development of a regional defense and security 
policy. No conclusions could be reached and the effort died. Later in the year, 
Kuwait's Sheikh laber a1 Ahmad AI sabah, then crown prince and prime minister but 
now emir, traveled to the Gulf states to push for his proposal for some sort of Gulf 
union. This initiative was endorsed by all of the future GeC states, leading to a series 
of slow-moving and rather unproductive meetings on the regional union concept. 
Because of other, more pressing issues on each nation's agenda, the idea of a Gulf 
federation was not advanced beyond a very limited conceptual level.7 
It may seem somewhat shocking that the Gulf Arabs did not seek close 
cooperation at this early time. Despite the lack of an immediate threat (such as the 
Iran-Iraq War or the invasion of Kuwait), many arguments existed in favor of greater 
coordination. These arguments, however, did not convince the future GeC members 
that the benefits of taking steps toward unity justified the costs. State sovereignty, as ,in 
the European Community, held sway over many decision makers' thoughts and kept 
cooperation from blooming. Also, the fi.nnly entrenched family rule in each state made 
rivalry and family pride factors in regional discussions. For example, the Saudis, 
ruling the largest and most powerful of the Arabian Peninsula states, had on several 
occasions brought force to bear against their neighbors. Such actions had not been 
forgotten by the smaller states; it would have been extremely difficult to justify a 
sudden move toward cooperation without some external stimulus. 
Likewise, the superpower with the most influence in the Gulf, the United 
States, saw no real point to Gulf security pacts in the 19705. In American eyes, the 
region was made secure through the surrogate policy of the "Nixon Doctrine." Iran 
played the role of the anti-eommunist substitute for direct United States supervision and 
became the "policeman of the Gulf." Iran's cooperation, taken with Oman's public 
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pro-Westem stance and Saudi Arabia's massive arms purchases from the United States, 
ensured that even an extensive Soviet presence in the Hom of Africa and the People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) would not challenge the Gulf and its vital oil 
supply. 8 
Therefore, efforts to unite the Gulf Arabs were half-hearted and generally non­
productive before the Iran-Iraq War. In fact, the only real development between the 
1976 Kuwaiti initiative and the start of the war was a proposal in 1980 for the 
establishment of a Gulf University.9 But the war changed attitudes toward regional 
cooperation. The Gulf states knew that their choices were limited if they wanted to 
support Iraq without incuning the wrath of Iran and their own Shi' ite populations. One 
option was to help the Iraqis massively and openly, counting upon the United States to 
intervene if Iran threatened the oil fields of the Arabian Peninsula. But the Kuwaitis 
led the Gulf sta~s (over the objections of Oman) in opposition of increased superpower 
influence in the area. A better option existed, one that had been on ice for five years ­
closer cooperation among the Arab Gulf states. 
De Gulf Cooperation Council 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GeC) became an organization as a result of 
continued Kuwaiti efforts. Scared at the prospect of further attacks on non-belligerent 
soil (especially their own), and in an attempt to keep the United States out of the Gulf, 
the Kuwaitis, through their foreign minister, recommended the creation of a Gulf Arab 
union in a working paper presented to the other five Gulf govemments in early 1981. 10 
This set the stage for the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia to invite his counterparts 
from Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAB, and Oman to Riyadh for the purpose of 
forming a regional organization. At their historic meeting on February 4, 1981, the 
formation of the GeC was announced with the following statement: 
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Since the United Arab Emirates, State of Bahrain, Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, Sultanate of Oman, State of Qatar and 
State of Kuwait realize the very close relations among them 
arising from their heritage, identical political, social and demo­
graphic structures and their shared cultural background; and 
since these states are desirous of deepening and developing 
cooperation and coordination amongst them in various fields, 
they have agreed to establish a new organization to be called 
the Gulf Cooperation Council, to be based in Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia. 11 
The GCC Charter, approved by the heads of state in May 1981 and printed in 
full as Appendix 1, lays out the structures of the organization. The organi7Jltion' s most 
important authority is the Supreme Council, comprised of the heads of the member 
states. Each member state gets a chance to hold the presidency, which is rotated based 
on the alphabetical order of the country's names in Arabic. This council meets once a 
year to discuss any matters affecting the GeC and its members. Any votes in the 
Supreme Council on substantive matters (each member state has one vote) must be 
unanimous in order to be valid. The policies and budget of the GeC are in the 
Supreme Council's control. In addition, the heads of state appoint the Secretary­
General of the GeC, review reports and studies submitted by the Ministerial Council 
and the Secretary-General, and approve all rules of procedure. The annual meeting of 
the Supreme Council has become an event capturing the world's attention; the 
communiques released at the end of each session indicate both the GeC's stance on 
major issues and the direction the heads of state see the organization going in the 
future. 
Foreign Ministers of the member states meet more often (every three months) as 
the Ministerial Council of the GeC. This group is charged to "propose policies, 
prepare recommendations, studies and projects aimed at developing cooperation and 
coordination between member states." Basically, this GeC wing is the filter through 
which ideas pass on their way to becoming proposals for the Supreme Council to 
consider. Because it meets more often than the Supreme Council, the Ministerial 
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Council engages more in substantive, hands--on issues than broad policy statements. 
Here also, each. state gets one vote in any non-procedural tally. The other major body 
of the GeC is the Secretariat-General, which runs the day-to-day affairs of the Council 
in addition to preparing special studies for the Supreme and Ministerial Councils. For 
most of the GeC's existence, the SecretaIy-General has been Abdullah Yacoub Bishara 
of Kuwait. 12 The continuity both in the Councils and in the office of the Secretary­
General has led to the stability of the GeC over the years. 
The written objectives of the GeC emphasize "coordination, integration and 
interconnection between member states in all fields." Considering the intense 
insecurity each state felt at the time of the Charter's adoption, it seemed odd that 
defense affairs and regional security were left off of the following list of specific fields 
of coordination in Article Four: economic and financial affairs; commerce, customs 
and communications; education and culture; social and health affairs; information and 
tourism; and legislation and administrative affairs. 13 The security area, it turns out, 
was consciously omitted by the Charter writers. Oman had presented proposals for th~ 
Charter dealing with this sensitive issue and calling for complete integration of the six 
states' militaIy forces. In addition, Oman pointed out the weakness which even a 
combined Gulf army would have and emphasized the need for open cooperation with a 
larger power -- the United States. The other states balked and adopted a Kuwaiti 
blueprint for the Charter instead, one that made no mention of defense cooperation and 
provided the skeleton for the final document.l4 
Despite the lack of a specific reference in the Charter to regional security, the 
acc summits since 1981 have been forums for·discussion on issues of security and 
common defense. The meeting at which the heads of state signed the Charter was 
apparently dominated by consultation about the Iran-Iraq War. Strategic guidelines for 
security issues were established emphasizing non-interference by foreigners and the 
responsibility of Gulf nations to handle their own affairs and keep international 
26 
conflicts out of the region. Despite such discussions, member states emphatically 
argued that the focus of the GeC was economic cooperation; not defense issues, in 
order to preempt charges from other Arab states that the GeC was a military alliance. 
The world (especially area states) did not believe this explanation - Iraq and Iran, 
excluded from the GeC talks, went ahead and immediately attacked the organization as 
"a military and security alliance. ,,15 
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THE Gee 1HROUGH THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR 
~lgsinJ Ranks 
The Gulf Cooperation Council took immediate steps to come together and 
protect the member states from the war's danger. Coordination began in a number of 
areas, ranging from a joint threat of "appropriate" oil measures against "aggressive" 
nations to the exchange of information on security and other matters. 1 The need for 
the latter became apparent after events in Bahrain during December 1981. Iranian­
backed terrorists attempted a coup against the island nations through assassination of 
Bahraini leaders.. Security forces in other member states, specifically Dubai in the 
UAE and Saudi Arabia, helped identify the plotters and foil the plot before it could be 
carried out. Despite the effectiveness in this case of infonnally exchanging internal 
security information, the shock waves caused by the nearly successful coup attempt 
helped to speed up the institutionalization of such security cooperation.2 
The Supreme Council's third summit (held in Manama, Bahrain in November 
1982) was dominated by discussion of defense issues and the threat from Iran. The 
latter was seen as severe because Iran had recently launched a massive counter­
offensive into Iraq. The heads of state lamented the "dangerous developments 
following Iran's crossing of international borders" and declared their support for the 
Iraqis. Although the Gee gave no direct military support to Iraq, despite repeated 
requests for such action, the public stance in favor of Iraq helped bring about a Gee 
(and especially Saudi) policy of giving large loans and grants to Iraq to pay for the 
war.3 The member states felt the need to deal with their own security as well, not just 
that of Iraq. After all, Iraq was potentially (and to Kuwait, in reality) as much of a 
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threat to the sovereignty of the Gulf states as Iran. Defense ministers submitted 
I	 recommendations to the GeC for the creation of a new regional defense foree, dubbed 
"Peninsula Shield. ,,4 Progress in this regard was rapid; ground troops from all sixI 
I 
states took part in "Peninsula Shield" military exercises in October 1983 (and again in 
1984). The maneuvers, held in the UAB with air cover from the Abu Dhabi air force, 
demonstrated the determination of the Gulf states to provide their own deterrent to 
I	 possibly hostile neighbors.5 In the event of an actual attack, the forces would not be 
nearly large enough to stop Iran, Iraq, or any other probable invader. In fact, the idea 
I 
I of regional defense in the event of aggression involved the use ofjoint GeC forces to 
occupy the belligerent until larger forces, most likely from the United States, arrived to 
•
defend the Gulf Arabs. Despite the lack of true power in the "Peninsula Shield," it did 
show the GeC's concern with regional security and its willingness to coordinate 
•
military activity a,nong member states in order to provide some degree of stability. 
Other military operations not connected to the ·Peninsula Shield" concept 
• 
followed. Joint air activities occurred between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in November' 
1983 and between the UAB and Oman in both February and April 1984. These 
I exercises did not take place under GeC auspices, but the cooperative spirit the 
organization provided certainly contributed to their occurrence. Even subsequent 
I 
I coordinated military operations between member states outside GeC channels were 
conducted on a much larger scale. In fact, based solely on the number of countries 
I 
involved in some of these activities, they could almost be called GeC efforts. For 
example, four of the GeC states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar) held joint 
air exercises in January 1985.6 
I Throughout the early to mid 19808 the GeC projected a unified anti-Iranian 
I 
I stand. The fourth summit of GeC heads of state convened in Doha, Qatar in late 1983. By this time, the belligerents had begun attacking each other's oil ships and 
facilities. Iran, knowledgeable of the GeC's "under the table" support of Iraq, hinted 
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that in retaliation it might make the entire Gulf a war zone and bar any tankers from 
leaving through the narrow Straits of Hormuz. The Supreme Council responded from 
Doha by stating their willingness to enter into "direct hostilities· with Iran if shipping 
lanes were in any way blocked7 Iran made good on its threat to attack oil tankers in 
May 1984, targeting ships on their way to or from Saudi and Kuwaiti ports. Defense 
ministers and military officers, although holding back from entrance into the conflict, 
decided to greatly expand their coordination activities in response to these Iranian acts 
of aggre~ion.8 
One manner in which the member states together sought to provide for their 
own safety was through an international body - the United Nations. The GeC 
suggested a resolution to the United Nations Security Council calling on "all states to 
respect the right of free navigation in the Gulf and refrain from any act which may lead 
to further escala~on and conflict." It was adopted with only minor revisions, an 
example of the international political condemnation the GeC could now summon 
against 1ran.9 Protective steps continued in the regional arena as well. The GeC 
approved the development of a Gulf Rapid Deployment Force to meet any direct attack 
on GCC soil. The Gulf RDF would never be a large force, but the GeC states hoped 
that its very existence, much like the ·Peninsula Shield" exercises discussed above, 
would serve as an additional deterrent to any potential adversaries. 10 
l\;fediBPon Efforts anc! the End 9f the War 
In 1985, the Gulf Cooperation Council members seemed to shift their approach 
to the conflict in the Gulf, both within the organization and as individual states. 
Several major factors contributed to the tum from anti-Iranian rhetoric and public 
support of Iraq to conciliatory gestures and mediation efforts. One is obvious - the 
disappointment in Iraq for not winning the war in four and a half years. The GeC 
states were also disappointed that Iraq had not accepted their financial support 
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gratefully or even politely. Instead, Iraq took the tens of billions of dollars in grants 
and loans while lambasting the Gulf Arabs for not offering larger amounts of money 
and for refusing to engage in direct military support. Another factor in the more 
neutral stance was the oil glut. As prices declined in the mid 19805, the source of 
member states' revenue and thus of potential financial aid for the Iraqis shnmk. The 
acc states had a great many things to spend money on besides the war, and began to 
think that bringing the war to an end, even if it meant no clear victory for either side, 
would be more beneficial than waiting for a possible Iraqi resurgence. 11 
The shift was made public at the fifth summit of the GeC rulers in late 1985. 
The communique issued as the meetings ended was much less critical of Iran than had 
previous statements from the organization. The Gee established a mediation team, 
headed by the Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, to renew peacemaking 
efforts between t;he belligerents. 12 This more "neutralist" slant of the organization was 
perhaps best stated by the summit's host, Sultan Qaboos of Oman. He pleaded for "the 
leaders of both states to show flexibility that could pave the way for good offices to end 
the war. It 
However, the acc's stance and the attempt to play the role of Ithonest broker" 
did not last for long. Neither side in the war had much faith in GeC peace efforts ­
Iran believed that the acc states were still aiding Iraq and thus could not be credible 
negotiators, while Iraq felt slighted by the perceived desertion of sister Arab states. 13 
In February 1986, after the Ayatollah Khomeini' s rejection of any peace with Iraq, the 
Iranians launched a large offensive in the south and captured the FAO Peninsula on 
Iraq's side of the Shatt ai-Arab (the fonner and current waterway boundary). Iranian 
troops were suddenly dangerously close to Kuwaiti soil. This Iranian advance, along 
with continued Islamic Republic attacks on oil tankers, shocked the acc states into 
speaking out in favor of Iraq again. 14 
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One impact of the Iranian success was the Kuwaiti decision to ask the 
•

•

superpowers for protection of its tankers. Kuwait had always been opposed to outside•
 intervention in the Gulf, but the situation demanded drastic action. The emirate faced a 
severe loss to its property, life, and revenue. It seems logical to say that the Kuwaiti 
request for superpower help constitutes the first failure of the GeC's regional security 
hopes. The United States at first refused the request. Kuwait then went to the Soviets, 
who in February 1987 agreed to reflag three Kuwaiti ships. Immediately the United 
States reversed its decision and allowed eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers to sail under the 
American flag. Despite GeC fears of danger accompanying increased superpower 
influence in the Gulf, the policy worked; after a short-lived surge in Iranian attacks, the 
Gulf soon saw safe passage of almost all ships. IS 
In early 1987, the Iranians moved past FAO and besieged the large Iraqi city of 
Basra. Although the Iranians attacked with incredible troop strength and fanatic zeal, 
the population center held out against the massive onslaught. This psychological 
victory turned the advantage in the war back to Iraq. Saddam Hussein had made clear 
his willingness to end the fighting for years, and despite previous promises to fight 
until the very last man, the Islamic Republic began to see advantages in proposals for 
ending the war. Whereas earlier GeC attempts at mediation through the Islamic 
Conference and United Nations had fallen on deaf Iranian ears, they now made some 
progress. 16 United Nations Resolution 598, passed by the Security Council in July 
1987, urged an immediate cease~fire in the Iran~Iraq War. This set up the framework 
for expanded GeC mediation between the belligerents. 17 Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini 
ordered a cessation of fighting in July 1988, bowing to pressure from moderates within 
the government as well as from demonstrators throughout the country. Upon the end 
of the conflict, the Islamic Republic abandoned much of its revolutionary propaganda 
and began emphasizing Iran's peaceful intentions and desire for closer ties with the 
Gulf states. 18 
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Having been an important topic of discussion at every Supreme Council meeting •
and most of the Foreign Ministers' gatherings, the war affected the GeC's first seven 
•
years so deeply that many questioned the organization's saliency once hostilities ended. 
If the GeC was created for reasons other than just fear of Iranian hegemony in the 
!
Gulf, then areas outside of security should have been addressed during this time. 
Indeed, many areas ranging from economic cooperation to cultural exchange had been• 
part of the GeC agenda during the war years. Especially in the economic realm, 
enough progress had been made to enable the organization to continue even after the 
war's end. 
Further support for the thesis that the GeC could survive beyond the Iran-Iraq 
War lies in the security field itself. Advances occurred in this area during the war even 
in areas unrelated to the war itself. The best example involves the border dispute 
between a GeC ~ember (Oman) and a non-member (the People's Democratic Republic 
of Yemen, or PDRY). The GeC played an aggressive role in negotiating a settlement 
and establishing better relations between the two nations. The GeC assigned Kuwait , 
and the United Arab Emirates the task of preventing any possible hostilities and 
bringing the two together for talks. After a series of meetings throughout the early 
19805 in Kuwait, the UAB, Oman, and the PDRY, agreement was reached on both the 
joint boundary and general relations. By 1985, Oman and the PDRY (which merged 
with the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in 1990 to form the Republic of Yemen) 
exchanged ambassadors and formally founded diplomatic relations. 19 This case 
highlights the GeC's expansion in the field of regional security into areas other than 
just the war, and its successful attempts at handling non-war concerns of the member 
states and the organization as a whole. 
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THE 1990-91 GULF WAR 
Prelude tQ.,Iraqi Agression 
Throughout the 198Os, the Gee states gave support to Iraq in the war against 
Iran, despite the fear felt (especially by Kuwait) towards Iraq. As mentioned earlierl , 
Iraq believed that Kuwait was part of the state of Iraq. This claim dates back to the 
eighteenth centwy, when Kuwait was nominally under Ottoman control. By the end of 
the nineteenth centwy, Kuwait was part of the viblyet (province) of Basra, now in 
southern Iraq. The Kuwait area included in the Basra vilsyet never held any Ottoman 
troops or representatives, however, making this claim of ownership based upon 
Ottoman history somewhat weak. 
Since independence in 1932, Iraq has on several occasions denied Kuwait's 
existence as a sovereign entity. King Gbazi openly called for Iraqi absorption of the 
city-state in the late 19305. When Abdul Karim Qassem overthrew the Iraqi monarchy 
in July, 1958, demands for Kuwait's incorporation became more strident. Kuwaiti 
independence was declared in June 1961 and Qassem immediately deployed armed 
forces at the border and reiterated the Basra vilayet argument for Iraqi control of the 
city-state. Only British and Arab League troops rushed to Kuwait dissuaded Iraqi 
aggression.2 
A Ba'th party coup d'etat in 1963 removed Qassem from power and in October 
recognized the independence of Kuwait. The new regime realized that the bellicosity 
toward Kuwait was doing nothing but alienating Iraq within the Arab world. Steps 
toward peace were taken by agreeing to move toWards recognition of the common 
boundary. It seems that Kuwait bought this limited concession; less than a week after 
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about eighty-five million dollar) loan.3 ~ 
the recognition of Kuwait, Iraq received a thirty million Kuwaiti dinar (at the time 
However, Iraqi ambitions were not stopped by this action. In 1969, Iraq 
stationed troops on Kuwaiti soil near Umm Qasr. An imminent Iranian attack was 
cited by Iraq as justification for this incursion into the city-state. The military presence 
remained even after the pretense of the Iranian threat proved unfounded.4 Iraqi 
laborers even began construction of a road in Kuwaiti territory in December 1972, 
using troops to protect the workers from any possible interference by Kuwaiti 
authorities. 
The Iraqis grew bolder in March 1973 by submitting the draft of a proposed 
treaty to the Kuwaitis. The proposal gave Iraq vast privileges in the territory of its 
southern neighbor, including the freedom to use Kuwaiti oil export facilities and access 
to the strategic Gulf islands of Bubiyan and Warba. The AI Sabah immediately rejected 
the treaty as an unacceptable infringement upon Kuwaiti sovereign rights, prompting 
the Iraqis to build a garrison at al-Samita -- in Kuwait! When the Kuwaiti authorities , 
moved in to stop Iraq, the intruders opened fire, resulting in one Iraqi and two Kuwaiti 
deaths.5 Kuwait responded to the crisis by closing the border, ceasing all aid to the 
Ba'thist regime, and recalling its ambassador from Baghdad. Iraq soon pulled back 
across the border under pressure from Saudi Arab~ Jordan, and Iran as well as 
Kuwait. Iraqis crossed the boundary (and quickly withdrew) again in 1976, but still 
pressed their claim to at least Bubiyan and Warba.6 
This history of Iraqi efforts to annex all or part of Kuwait was but one of many 
factors leading to the August 1990 invasion. Financial difficulty, more than any other 
factor, caused Saddam Hussein to initiate the crisis. Still hurting from the costs of the 
war with Iran, Iraq demanded Gulf Arab forgiveness of all war debts and an additional 
thirty billion dollar grant. Hussein believed that his eight year war defended the 
eastern frontier of the Arab world from what would have been Iranian hegemony; 
3S 
support from the rich Arabs of the Gulf was only natural to pay for this invaluable 
service. All of the GCC nations (including Kuwait) refused such orders, citing Iraq's 
initiation of the conflict with Iran and their own shaky economies. 
Oil also played a large role in the decision to attack Kuwait. Iraq strongly 
objected to Kuwaiti overproduction which forced world oil prices downward and 
negatively impacted Iraqi revenues. Hussein had personally told King Fahd ibn Abdul 
Am of Saudi Arabia to somehow convince the GeC states, especially Kuwait, to 
reduce production to levels below their OPEC quotas in order to help Iraq's financial 
recovery. However, GeC unity prevailed; even if King Fahd mentioned this request to 
other Gulf heads of state, he most certainly did not push for its acceptance.7 In 
addition to the quota issue, Iraq claimed that the Rumailah oil field, along the Iraqi­
Kuwaiti border, ha!! been exploited by Kuwait during the war with Iran. To prevent 
Iran from taking the field, Iraq had placed mines in its half and stopped production. 
Kuwaiti production, however, continued full steam. Hussein believed that Kuwait 
sucked oil from Iraq's half and demanded $2.4 billion dollars in exchange for the oil 
Kuwait had stolen.8 
Finally, politics influenced Hussein's decision to invade. Large numbers of 
soldiers returning from the war front put immense pressure on the economy of Iraq and 
the political viability of Hussein himself. Being a man of at least caution and perhaps 
paranoia9, he surely feared an uprising from the discontented army. Traditionally, the 
best way to keep an upset army from revolting is to send them on a foreign expedition ­
- such as the foray into Kuwait. The population as a whole was somewhat disgruntled 
as well. After eight years of sacrifice during the Iran-Iraq War, benefits still had not 
come to the demoralized Iraqi people. A quick and easy victory over a poorly 
defended neighbor would help restore national pride and enhance Hussein's political 
position. lO 
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lbUnvasion otKuwait and the WorlJl.1BesDOnse 
Iraq began its attack on its southern neighbor with nearly 150,000 soldiers, 
•

•
almost 2000 tanks, and many Soviet-built aircraft 00 August 2, 1990. The emir of 
Kuwait had not mobilized his troops out of fear of provoking Saddam Hussein. Thus, 
•
•
except for scattered resistance, Kuwait's defenses were crushed and all of the city-state 
was firmly in Iraqi bands within twelve hours of the border violation. The royal family 
(minus one of the emir's brothers who died defending the Royal Palace) escaped to 
Saudi Arabia and begged the GCC and the United States for immediate assistance in 
their restoration. il 
The GeC's response to the crisis caught nobody by surprise. Each member 
state made statements upholding their belief in Kuwait's sovereignty and demanding 
Iraqi withdrawal. Attempts by the Gulf Arabs to quickly bring about resolution of the 
conflict through ~ direct conversations with Saddam Hussein and public 
condemnation failed as the Iraqis made it clear that they were not leaving Kuwait. At 
their December 1990 summit in Doha, Qatar, the Supreme Council issued a scathing 
criticism of Iraq. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia said, 
It was beyond our expectations that one day we would hold 
a meeting with one of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries 
under the siege of a vicious occupation, not by an expected 
enemy, but by a country which used to be considered a friend 
an ally..•a brother who had received from us unlimited and 
every possible support when he himself was confronted by 
danger.l2 
The host of the meetings, Sheikh Khalifa ibn Hamad AI Thani, justified such GeC 
indictment by stating that lithe aggression launched by Iraq against Kuwait constitutes 
aggression on all the GeC member-states. tt 13 
From its Riyadh headquarters, the administrative wing of the Gee also spoke 
about the invasion. Secretary-General Bishara acknowledged that the organization 
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failed in one of its most important roles. Although a fonner advocate of Arab unity•
above state interests, Bishara admitted after the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait that 
We [the GeC] should have realired the nature of the Iraqi 
regime as a de-stabilizing force, but as Arabs we suffered 
•
~ from an inability to contemplate the invasion by one Arab 
country of another..•this inability to detach reality from illusion 
is the lethal flaw of Arab politics. 14 
The organization vowed to restore the longtime royal family to power in Kuwait. 
Although some of the other ruling families had differences with the Al Sabah, their 
common GeC bonds and fear of further Iraqi aggression encouraged them to support 
the traditional regime. The American presence in the Gulf (see below) was seen as an 
unfortunate but necessary step toward defending their nations and liberating Kuwait. 
The Doha Declaration issued at the end of the 1990 summit states the GeC members' 
willingness to see the process of restoring of Al Sabah through to the end. Peaceful 
means of resolution were to be sought first of all, but military action would not be 
ruled out as long as Iraqi troops remained in Kuwait. IS 
The Americans did not, and in fact could not, rush to save Kuwait upon its 
invasion. 16 However, the United States (with plenty of GeC help) turned international 
opinion forcefully against the Iraqi action within days. Condemnation came from all 
quarters - West and East, Arab and non-Arab. Immediate Arab efforts (by both the 
GCC and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak) toward reconciliation failed and Iraqi 
troops massed at the Saudi border. The Kingdom asked the United States to send 
defensive forces since the small GeC capabilities could not stand up to any Iraqi attack. 
The "Peninsula Shield" concept was one of deterrence and had never been envisioned 
as a force able to fight a prolonged war against a superior enemy such as the Iraqis. 
On August 8, President George Bush announced the deployment of U.S. troops in 
northern Saudi Arabia. Soon afterward, contingents from several Arab states, 
•
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including all of the GCC members, joined Americans and Saudis along the borders•
with Iraq and Kuwait as part of "Desert Shield."17 
•
The United Nations acted almost immediately on the Kuwaiti issue. The 
organization began to pass resolutions chastising Iraq and calling for its withdrawal 
•
•
from Kuwait. The only reason these UN actions met with such success was the new, 
collaborative relationship between the superpowers. Normally, the Soviet Union would 
veto such U.S.-sponsored measures as the anti-Iraq resolutions. But Moscow had no 
• 
interest in threatening its recently-won diplomatic exchanges with the Gulf states and 
thus went along with the American and UN actions in the Gulf. As time progressed, 
and Iraq gave no indications that it would comply with UN mandates, the resolutions 
grew more and more severe. 18 Economic sanctions called for in early resolutions 
evolved into Resolution 678, adopted November 29. UN states were charged "to use 
all necessary m~s to uphold and implement" previous resolutions demanding Iraqi 
withdrawal and Kuwaiti sovereignty.19 
•
•
On January 17, 1991, Coalition forces attacked Kuwait and Iraq with massive ' 
air strikes on military and communication sites. The Iraqi air force was crippled, 
allowing the Allied aircraft to have nearly unhindered control of the skies over Iraq. 
Sorties followed on more varied targets, including industrial and scientific sites.20 All 
of these attacks set up the land campaign, which began during the last week of 
February. The land war decimated the Iraqi forces. Many of them left Kuwait before 
the Coalition troops arrived, fleeing back into Iraq. Unfortunately for the Iraqis, the 
road they took to Basra was the only one out of Kuwait. The Allies had no difficulty 
bombing the road in front of and behind the 1000 vehicle escape convoy. What 
I	 followed was a massacre; those involved recalled that it was much like "clubbing baby 
seals. ,,21 Bush soon announced a ceasefire rather than risk international criticism for I	 slaughtering the nearly defenseless retreating Iraqis. 
•
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• 
The liberation of Kuwait had cost tens of thousands of Iraqi lives while only 
about 150 Coalition forces died in action. 22 However, despite this extraordinary 
lopsided tally and Hussein's surrender, the Allies failed in one of their major goals­
removing Hussein from power. He gained a great deal of credibility and popularity 
among the Arab "street" because of his stand against the West. The fact that he 
remained in control of the (albeit devastated) country was quite a psychological victory 
for Hussein. His intransigeance worried the Gee states because of the instability he 
brought to the region and the resentment he would likely harbor toward the Arab Gulf. 
Statements from Gee heads of state throughout the war about Hussein were unpleasant 
and not conducive toward any future rapprochement. Iraq, though defeated, would not 
be given the trust of the member states again. 
•

•
 
I
 
I
 
I 
I 
I 
I 1HEIMPACIS OF 1HE GULF WAR 
I 
I 
Immediate E(f'ms on the Member State! 
I Although Saddam Hussein did not sucoeed in his attempt to make Kuwait a 
permanent part of Iraq, the city-state was not the same in March 1991 as it had been in I August 1990. The Iraqis made no attempt to return the country to the same condition 
as it was when originally occupied. Estimates in May 1991 put the loss of Kuwaiti 
revenue during the occupation at over sixty billion dollars and :reconstruction costs at 
I some ten to twenty billion dollars. 1 This rebuilding expense figure is much less than 
I 
the $100 billion guess initially ventured, but even the lower amount exceeds Kuwait's 
I export earnings from oil during any two years in the 19805. United Nations Resolution 
flJ2 requires Iraqi compensation for Kuwaiti reconstruction expenses. However, the ' 
costs of Iraq's own rebuilding efforts, the staggering figures involved in the proposed 
I reparations, and Hussein's unwillingness to pay make it likely that neither Kuwait nor 
I 
the other Gee states will ever have their war costs reimbursed.2 
I The damage to Kuwait's oil industry was the most publicized aspect of post­
occupation Kuwait. As they evacuated Kuwait in February 1991, Iraqi soldiers were 
I 
ordered to set some 600 of Kuwait's nearly 1()()() oil wells ablaze, and simply open up 
many of the rest, pouring millions of barrels of oil into the Gulf. Kuwait's finance 
minister estimated that quelling the fires, stopping the leaks, and fixing the oil facilities 
I in Kuwait would cost some twenty billion dollars and take several years. 3 The effects 
of the oil spill on water life in the Gulf and the effects of the billowing smoke from the 
I 
I well fires on the atmosphere shocked the world. Ecologists warned that it might be 
decades before the Gulf returned to the condition it was in before these disasters. 
• 
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The invasion also affected the Kuwaitis themselves deeply. The psychological •
trauma of occupation prompted many residents to leave the country when the Iraqis 
•
settled in. Others were forced to stay, often enduring abuse and sometimes torture. 
Occupation at first unified Kuwaitis around the exiled emir, who became the symbol of 
•
•
their lost nation and their disrupted lives. Soon, however, those who remained in the 
city-state became bitter about the royal family's rapid evacuation and apparent 
disregard for the citizens they left behind. The emir and his entourage still flew around 
• 
the world, spending millions of dollars and enjoying the benefits of royalty, while 
hundreds of thousands of their subjects suffered in Kuwait.4 
• 
Expatriate workers also experienced difficulties because of the Iraqi aggression 
against Kuwait. First of all, the world boycotted Iraqi and occupied Kuwaiti oil, 
leaving nearly a million expatriates in Kuwait alone with little or no work. Most of 
these evacuated the city-state in the fall of 1990, putting an enormous strain on their 
home economies (from both the lack of remittance income and the burden of caring for 
so many returning citizens). Palestinians and Yemenis had troubles in other GeC 
states as well as in Kuwait. When Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman 
Yasir Arafat and Republic of Yemen President Ali Abdallah Saleh publicly supported 
Saddam Hussein in the war, several Arab Gulf states expelled large portions of their 
Palestinian and Yemeni populations.5 
For the other GeC states, the surprise invasion heightened the insecurity 
inherent in Gulf existence. Kuwait fell so quickly to the Iraqi onslaught that the GeC 
I members, especially Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar, feared that they would be next. 
Hussein's massing of troops along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border gave rise to the theory that 
I he was planning on a massive offensive aimed at dominating the Arab Gulf and thus a 
large percentage of the world's oil supply. The first GeC attempt to alleviate the crisis 
was through Arab channels. As indicated before6, Hussein refused to budge and 
declared that Kuwait was a permanent part of Iraq. The next step, as repulsive as it 
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was to certain sectors of Gulf Arab society, involved inviting the strong West into the 
I area for protection. 
The influx of American (as well as British and French) troops in the Gulf states 
I 
I directly exposed these countries to Western democracy. Thus, even domestic political 
systems were affected by the Gulf War. The situation in Kuwait provides the best 
example of such a political impact. The National Assembly, before its suspension in 
I 1986, had contributed to Kuwait's reputation as a rather liberal and open society by 
Gulf standards. Kuwaiti democracy activists in exile because of the Iraqi invasion 
I 
I stressed the importance of restoring representative structures once their nation was 
liberated. However, they did give their full support to the reign of Sheikh laber (and 
to overall Al Sabah dominance of Kuwaiti political life), calling for the restoration in 
I full of the emirate's former government. In return for this support, and under pressure 
from the Western ~tes saving his city-state, the emir promised to renew the suspended 
I 
I Assembly once Kuwait was freed. 7 
Not unexpectedly, the emir stalled on this initiative once his rule was restored 
by putting off the election date and imposing martial law. Hundreds of court cases 
I dealing with suspected Iraqi collaborators dominated the royal family's agenda; the 
return of the Assembly and reform of the system ranked much lower.8 Eventually, in 
I 
I October 1992, elections were held for seats in the Kuwaiti National Assembly. As 
before, only adult males from pre-I920 resident families could take part. Still, the 
I 
elections drew the world's attention and brought some measure of representative 
government to the Gulf again. ·Opposition· or "opposition-endorsed" candidates won 
thirty-five of the fifty seats up for grabs. The cabinet also underwent a reshuffle, with 
I various opposition groups gaining representation. The most dramatic move involved the 
appointment of a non-royal to the position of second deputy prime minister, in the past 
always held by a member of the ruling AI Sabah family. 9 
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Other Gee states seemed to catch this interest in increased democratization. 
I Bahrain t S emir announced in late 1992 the formation of a consultative body, with thirty 
members to be selected by the emir. Sheikh Khalifa ibn Hamad Al Thani, the emir of 
Qatar, was presented with a petition from fifty-four prominent citizens in May 1992. 
The document proposed free elections for a parliament, a written constitution, and 
more political freedom for individuals: 
I This [proposed] parliamentary body should have the respon­
sibility of creating a permanent constitution that guarantees 
I
 the establishment of democracy and outlines the basis of gov­
ernment...Such demands, ...constitute a recognition of the 
right of citizens to run the affairs of their nation, and is in 
I accordance with our Islamic faith, which directs us to adopt 
I
 
consultations and to abide by them.
 
No written constitution came about from this initiative, but a consultative body has
 
been elected to advise the emir.
 
I Likewise, Saudi Arabia heard many voices calling for more representation after
 
the war. The Saudis had never experimented with any form of parliamentary body. AI,
 
•I
 
~ Saud rulers, however, have always conducted majlls, traditional tribal meetings
 
whereby anyone can speak to the top rulers about issues of concern. This practice has
 
perhaps kept the royal family in closer contact with the people than in a representative
 
system. A comparable situation in the United States would be a weekly open meeting
 
whereby anybody could have a short one-on-one session with, for example, a governor. 
I 
I Thus, the idea of democracy and the importance of the people is not foreign to the Gulf 
Arabs. In order to satisfy those who pressed for more than just the majlis, King Fahd 
, 
approved the establishment of a Consultative Assembly with sixty members to be 
appointed by the king. The Assembly would review decisions of the Council of 
Ministers, and have the power to overrule such decisions. 10 However, this long­
J promised development still has not born froit. Also, King Fahd bas rejected the idea of 
a new written constitution -- the official Saudi line is that since the Quran was God­
44 
t
 
f
 
I
 
t 
I
 
I 
, I 
given and is in itself the perfect constitution, no human has the right to supersede it 
with another, man-made basis for society. 
Lessons Learned by the Gee 
The most important impact of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on the Council itself 
involved regional security and collective self defense. The Gee found out that a small 
Gulf force such as "Peninsula ShieldIt would not deter ambitious neighbors. Even with 
massive arms purchases, the armies of the GeC simply are not large enough to face 
down a potential enemy. Part of the problem is population. With many less citizens 
combined than either Iran or Iraq singly, the GeC member states cannot develop a 
fighting force of any size without either drawing needed talent away from industry and 
development or hiring troops as mercenaries from other nations. 
This last option, using other nations' soldiers to defend the Gulf, was part of the 
so-called Damascus Declaration of March 1991.. According to the terms of the regional 
defense agreement, Syria and Egypt would deploy tens of thousands of troops in the 
GeC countries. In exchange, billions of dollars would go from the oil-rich states to the 
poorer Syria and Egypt. This option came about as a direct result of the roles played 
by Hafez al-Assad and Hosni Mubarak in Iraq's defeat in the 1990-91 Gulf War. Syria 
and Egypt had contributed 20,000 and over 30,000 men respectively to the Coalition 
forces which fought in the war. 11 Some viewed this declaration, the first of its kind in 
the Arab world trading a large amount of money for semi-permanent protection, as the 
beginning of a new Arab order, centered around the GeC. However, the Damascus 
Declaration fell through over the issue of payment to the nations supplying the troops. 
Most observers consider it unlikely that much except positive relations will ever come 
of the GeC agreement with Egypt and Syria. 
Another option for the defense of the Gulf Arabs was the continuing presence of 
the United States. To some extent this has been the GeC regional security decision by 
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default. American troops, whose presence began with the "Desert Shield" operation in 
I	 1990, have remained in the area and seem more connected militarily to the Arab Gulf 
states than either Egypt or Syria. Perhaps the Gee member states felt that the United 
I 
I States could be relied upon much more than sister Arab nations. Syria has not always 
seen eye to eye with the Gulf Arabs on issues such as the Palestine question and the 
Iran-Iraq war. Likewise, Egypt-Gulf relations have not always been rosy; Nasser kept 
I tens of thousands of Egyptian troops in Yemen for years to fight Saudi-backed tribes. 
-
l 
The policies of Egypt and Syria were much closer to those of the GeC members after 
the Gulf War. Still, the rulers of the GeC must have thought about the temptation that 
Syria and Egypt would feel with tens of thousands of troops near the rich oil fields. 
The direct non-Gulf Arab military presence, along with the shadow of hundreds of 
thousands of eager soldiers at home, could very well become more of a hostage 
situation than a protective one for the Gulf Arabs. After all, although Saddam Hussein 
had been given billions of dollars in loans and direct assistance by the GeC countries 
during the long war with Iran, which the organization thought would malce him 
indebted for life, Hussein did not hesitate to invade and occupy Kuwait. 
The member states themselves had not always agreed on the question of regional 
security. For example, Oman and Kuwait often disagreed on the role of outside forces. 
Oman, with strong ties to Great Britain and more recently to the United States as well, 
felt that having a strong Western presence in the Gulf would be the best mode of 
defense, not only for Oman but for the entire Gulf region. Kuwait typically 
represented the opposite view. Kuwait's prerogative prevailed in the early stages of the 
GeC, as organizational statements emphasized superpower non-involvement in Gulf 
affairs and the need for regional states to handle their disputes among themselves. As 
late as 1989, a Kuwaiti publication emphasized Kuwait's adherence to the principle of 
"resisting all military alliances that evolved as a result of the Cold War between the 
Eastern and Western blocs. ,,12 However, the AI Sabah and most other"Arab solution" 
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partisans finally acknowledged the superiority of strong Western armies over the flimsy 
-Peninsula Shield- of the GeC when only the former proved able to liberate Kuwait. 
Considering the first nine years of the GeC's existence, only such a tragedy as the 
Iraqi invasion could have moved Kuwait away from its conceptions about keeping Arab 
problems within the Arab world and toward the somewhat unholy alliance with a 
Western power. The momentum of the organization moved quickly and decisively in 
the direction of acceptance of outside forces in the Gulf once Kuwait, the most 
outspoken supporter of -doing it ourselves, - reversed its attitude. The remarkable part 
of the Gulf War, and its relation to security in the Gulf, is thus the unity which the 
GeC displayed (concerning the value of inviting and keeping foreign troops in the 
region) once the decision was made to liberate Kuwait at all costs. 
Despite concerns that the absence of a direct threat would break it apart, the 
GeC had found itself a viable organization when the Iran-Iraq War ended. The much 
larger shock of the invasion of one their sister member states brought the countries 
together even closer as each feared its own absorption into a Gulf mega-state. 
Although the invasion and occupation proved the inadequacy of the organization's 
collective defense/regional security function, it also gave the GeC nations a hint that 
such aggression most likely would have occurred even earlier without the strength in 
numbers the GeC provided. Events in the 19805 such as the assassination attempts in 
Bahrain13 proved that internal security could be improved with formal channels of 
communication between the GeC countries. The 1990-91 Gulf War proved the 
vulnerability of the Gulf Arabs and the desperate need for enhanced cooperation in 
security from external threats. 
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PROSPECTS FOR GULF SECURITY
 
The GCC countries have so many aspects of their existence in common that it 
becomes difficult for one to envision a future without further steps toward unity. 
Similarities in language, culture, religion, and natural resources are obvious. These 
factors alone hint at eventual successful integration - the thirteen British colonies in the 
late eighteenth century had less in common but were able to come together. The 
advances of the colonies, first through confederation and soon union, came despite 
divergent points of view on the nature of threats facing them and how to respond. 
Now, after Kuwaiti liberation, the GeC states seem to think very much alike about 
similar issues. If this is truly the case, then the commonalities in cultural areas will 
serve as catalysts for unity. 
As discussed in previous sections, regional security issues have dominated the 
GeC since its creation. First the Iran-Inlq War and soon thereafter the invasion of 
Kuwait ensured that the Arab Gulf states would seek strength in numbers as a solution 
to the threats around them. Providing for the defense of the Gulf became a hotly 
debated issue in the 1980s, with all of the GeC members agreeing that more should be 
done but disagreeing on the methods of doing so. Even today, the GeC has not made 
it clear whether its medium and long-range defense plans will involve United States 
forces, or those of other Arab states, or simply their own enhanced militaries. 
This uncertainty about how to handle regional security is leaning in the direction 
of closer cooperation. The Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman reflects this attitude: 
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...the GeC is..•a regional framework for cooperation with 
complete programs and purposes. Defending its countries 
against dangers is one of those programs.••Indeed, there is 
an urgent need for revising this, and time, constant work, 
and the desire of the member countries to strengthen the 
council, guarantee dealing with this matter. The Sultanate 
has prepared a strategic report, that His Majesty the Sultan 
himself has supervised, to deal with this defect I 
Others in the GeC also emphasize the unity of the member states. As King Fahd of 
Saudi Arabia said at the thirteenth GeC summit in December 1992, "We are one hand 
and one heart. It He also made clear his hope that the meetings would Itfurther 
strengthen cooperation in all fields among GeC states•.,2 
Perhaps the most compelling factor leading toward greater unity among the 
GeC states is the lack of any viable alternative. Just as the members of the European 
Community are finding that going it alone in Europe means economic hardship and 
lack of opportunity, the GeC members realize that going it alone in the Gulf means 
giving out invitations for aggression. If any of the Anlb Gulf nations (except perhaps 
Saudi Arabia) were to drop out of the GeC structure and end the harmony usually 
existing between the GeC countries, that nation would find itself an easy target for 
Iranian or Iraqi manipulation, if not outright control. 
An example of the value of togetherness can be taken from the headlines of 
autumn and winter 1992. Three strategic islands located near the Straits of Hormuz 
(Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb) had been administered jointly by Iran and 
Sharjah (the third largest of the United Arab Emirates) since 1971. On September 10, 
1992, Iran announced that it and not Sharjah was the tn1e owner of the islands and 
began expelling hundreds of UAB nationals, in direct violation of a 1971 treaty. 3 
Iranian forces on Abu Musa even refused to allow a ship from the UAE to stop at the 
island, supposedly because they did not hold Iranian identity papers. Not 
unexpectedly, the UAB, the GeC, and the Arab world as a whole condemned the 
Iranian action and called for immediate negotiations. 
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- Besides the determination to see that Iraq was kept down by the United Nations 
and United States forces still in the Gulf, this was the first real challenge to the GeC 
since the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. All parties watched intently to see if the GeC 
would rally around the issue and unite in opposition to the apparent aggression. 
Indeed, despite previous dissention within the UAB and the GeC over other issues, the 
organization released a statement calling Iranian activity -a blatant violation of the 
good-neighborly relations and spirit of understanding and cooperation. -4 The GeC 
states knew of the two submarines Iran had bought from Russia (the first such vessels 
to be owned by a Gulf state) and heard rumors of plans to purchase more. Abu Musa, 
with its location in the center of the lower Gulf, would be an excellent base for these 
submarines.5 
Eventually, the crisis subsided as Iran let UAB nationals back onto Abu Musa 
and basically returned to the post-1971 status quo. Most likely, the Islamic RepUblic's 
leaders underestimated the determination of the GeC, and in fact the Arab world as a 
whole, to stick by the UAB in the crisis. Thus, they attempted to bring back the better 
relations they had won with the Gulf Arabs through temaining neutral in the 199Q..91 
Gulf War. However, Iranian ambitions still frighten the Gee nations, perhaps even 
more than was the case immediately after the tevolution. With Iraq now in shambles, 
no true Gulf balance of power exists. Only the presence of the United States keep Iran 
from having its way in the entite region. Thus, the GeC states may view further 
unification as a necessary step toward creating a counterforce to the Islamic Republic's 
overwhelming potential. 
Disunitt 
Although most factors indicate that the Gulf Arabs will continue along the road 
toward unification and enhanced cooperation in the field of regional security, several 
important influences are working in the other direction. The first of these is history. 
Almost all of the GeC member states have fought with almost all of the others at some 
time within the last hundred years. Animosities remaining from many of these 
conflicts have intensified rivalries between the ruling families, and vice versa. Even 
within each of the member countries, there are often political battles being waged 
which necessarily lead to organizational disunity. An excellent example is the 
squabbling between Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Even though they are partners in the 
United Arab Emirates, the two more often than not disagree on major issues such as 
relations with Iran and regional security. If elements within each nation are 
fragmented, it seems unlikely that large steps toward mrity can be successfully taken. 
One might believe that the recent threat to the sovereignty of GeC member 
Kuwait would have shocked the others into putting aside their disputes and cooperating 
more fully. A example involving Saudi Arabia and Qatar has shown that this is not 
necessarily the case. On September 30, 1992, armed conflict erupted along the two 
nations' border at a Qatari post at Al-Khaffus. At least two soldiers died (the exact 
details of the clash are disputed) and the nations seemed on the brink of further 
hostilities.6 This development served to "weaken the GCC," according to Kuwait's 
Crown Prince, who attempted to mediate between the two countries.7 It was not until 
a set of meetings the night before the GeC heads of state summit in Abu Dhabi that the 
dispute was settled. It took someone outside the GeC structure, President Hosni 
Mubarak of Egypt, to negotiate the tenns of an agreement upon which the two states 
would agree. 8 
This conflict illustrates the security dangers within the GeC. Many of the 
borders between the GeC states are undefined. Ifoil is found in these areas (as it was 
in the Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone) difficulties will arise and agreements will need to 
be worked out. Even in the waters of the Gulf itself disputes exist. One is between 
member states Bahrain and Qatar over the small Hawar Islands. Although just off the 
west coast of the Qatar Peninsula, much closer to Qatar than Bahrain, the islands are 
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administered by the latter.9 Other Gulf disputes center around offshore rights. With 
many of the land boundaries which extend to the coast still undefined, determining the 
territorial waters of each state remains extremely difficult. 
Even unifying elements sometimes have an obstacle. 1be common 
organizational opposition to Iranian hegemony in the Gulf leads one to believe that each 
state thought alike regarding Iran. However, some of the Gulf states., specifically 
Dubai in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, have had a history of closer 
cooperation with the Iranians than with some of their GeC sister states. Even as the 
organization helped Iraq in its war against Iraq, some elements within the GeC wished 
for an Islamic Republic victory. Likewise, some states have wanted to rekindle 
relations with Iraq faster than Kuwait and Saudi Arabia would like. 
Qatar, as a result of its dispute with Saudi Arabia, decided to act in ways the 
GeC would not approve. For example, by the end of 1992 Iraq re-received Qatar's 
ambassador. Qatar thus became the first GeC state to establish post-Gulf War relations 
with Saddam Hussein. The Qataris also took steps with Iran which raised eyebrows in 
the other Arab Gulf states. Although the GeC generally had tried to improve relations 
with Iran ever since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, the organization proceeded 
with caution. When the Gulf island struggle alienated the Islamic Republic from the 
GeC, Qatar went ahead and continued business as usual with Tehran. 10 
The Future of.the Gulf 
The Gulf Cooperation Council is a young organization, not yet fifteen years old. 
One would not expect such a newcomer to transform Gulf politics. Indeed, although 
the GeC has made incredible progress in the economic area, among others, the Gulf 
remains an unstable region. The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait proved that regional 
security, the original impetus for and arguably the important function of the 
organization, had not developed as a result of the GeC's efforts. 
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The elements which seem to keep the GeC from coming closer together do not 
necessarily mean that the GeC will stagnate at its current level of unification. In fact, 
it seems that the GeC is doing rather well as an organization considering its short 
tenure. The European Community is still struggling with issues of national sovereignty 
despite its decades of existence. The border disputes and family rivalries which 
characterize member state relations reflect the social structures and history of the region 
and should not be seen as major threats to Gulf cooperation. In fact, the same history 
and culture which in some ways separate the nations of the GeC also serve in many 
other ways to unify them. The common language, religion, and social background all 
give the GeC a distinct advantage over most other regional organizations, especially 
the diverse EC. 
The real question remains -- can the GeC provide a regional security system for 
the member states' collective defense? The detennination the member stales have 
shown in both ending the Iran-Iraq War and liberating Kuwait indicate their dedication 
to keeping their states free of Iranian and Iraqi dominance. For now, the United States 
protects the Arab Gulf from any threat, but in the future security most likely will come 
from the GeC nations themselves. Massive arms purchases and technological 
advancement since the 1990-91 Gulf War have only added to their large, although still 
not adequate, defense capabilities. With time, a solid organizational structure 
supported fully by all of the Arab Gulf states could become not only the protector of 
GeC members and the Gulf region, but also a stabilizing influence upon the volatile 
Middle East in general. 
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APPENDIX
 
CHARTER, COOPERATION COUNCIL
 
FOR THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF
 
The States of the United Arab Emirates, the State of Bahrain, the KiDadom of 
Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, and the State of 
Kuwait, 
Being fully aware of their mutual bonds of special relations, common characteristics 
and similar systems founded on the Creed of Islam; and based on their faith in the 
common destiny and destination that link their peoples; and in view of their desire to 
effect coordination, integration, and interconnection between them in all fields; and 
based on their conviction that coordination, cooperation, and integration between them 
serve the higher goals of the Arab Nation; and, in order to strengthen their cooperation 
and reinforce their common links; and in an endeavor to complement efforts already 
begun in all vital scopes that concern their peoples and realize their hopes for a better 
future on the path to unity of their States; and in conformity with the Charter of the 
League of Arab States which calls for the realization of closer relations and stronger 
bonds; and in order to channel their efforts to reinforce and serve Arab and Islamic 
causes, have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE ONE, Establishment of Council
 
A council shall be established hereby to be named The Cooperation Council for the
 
Arab States of the Gulf, hereinafter referred to as Cooperation Council.
 
ARTICLE TWO, Headquarters
 
The Cooperation Council shall have its headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
 
ARTICLE THREE, Cooperation Council Meetings
 
The Council shall hold its meetings in the stale where it has its headquarters, and may
 
convene in any member state.
 
ARTICLE FOUR, Objectives
 
The basic objectives of the Cooperation Council are:
 
1. To effect coordination, integration, and interconnection between member states in all 
fields in order to achieve unity between them. 
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2. Deepen and strengthen relations, links and scopes of cooperation now prevailing 
between their peoples in various fields. 
3. Formulate similar regulations in various fields including the following: 
a. Economic and financial affairs 
b. Commerce, customs and communications 
c. Education and culture 
d. Social and health affairs 
e. Information and tourism 
f. Legislation and administrative affairs 
4. Stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, mineralogy, 
agriculture, water and animal resources; the establishment of scientific research centers, 
implementation of common projects, and encourage cooperation by the private sector 
for the good of their peoples. 
\ 
ARTICLE FIVE, Coundl Membership 
The Cooperation Council shall be formed of the six states that participated in the 
Foreign Ministers' meeting held at Riyadh on 4 February 1981. 
ARTICLE SIX, Orpnizaticms of the Cooperation Council
 
The Cooperation Council shall have the following main organizations:
 
1. Supreme Council to which shall be attached the Commission for Settlement of 
Disputes. 
2. Ministerial Council. 
3. Secretariat-General.
 
Each of these organizations may establish branch organizations as necessary.
 
ARTICLE SEVEN, Supreme Council 
1. The Supreme Council is the highest authority of the Cooperation Council and shall 
be formed of heads of member states. Its presidency shall be rotatory based on the 
alphabetical order of the names of the member states. 
2. The Supreme Council shall hold one regular session every year. Extraordinary 
sessions may be convened at the request of any member seconded by another member. 
3. The Supreme Council shall hold its sessions in the territory of member states. 
4. A Supreme Council shall be considered valid if attended by two thirds of the 
member states. 
ARTICLE EIGHT, Supreme Council's FunctiODS 
The Supreme Council shall endeavor to achieve the objectives of the Cooperation 
Council, particularly as concerns the following: 
1. Review matters of interest to the member states. 
2. Lay down the higher policy for the Cooperation Council and the basic line it should 
follow. 
3. Review the recommendations, reports, studies and common projects submitted by 
the Ministerial Council for approval. 
4. Review reports and studies which the Secretary-General is charged to prepare. 
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5. Approve the bases for dealing with other states and international organizations. 
6. Approve the rules of procedures of the Commission for Settlement of Disputes and 
nominate its members. 
7. Appoint the Secretary-General. 
8. Amend the Charter of the Cooperation Council. 
9. Approve the Council's Internal Rules. 
10. Approve the budget of the Secretariat-General. 
ARTICLE NINE, Voting in Supreme Coundl 
1. Each member of the Supreme Council shall have one vote. 
2. Resolutions of the Supreme Council in substantive matters shall be carried by 
unanimous approval of the member states participating in the voting, while resolutions 
on procedural matters shall be carried by majority vote. 
ARTICLE TEN, CommisGoD for Settlement of Disputes 
1. The Cooperation Council shall have a commission called "Commission for 
Settlement of Disputes" and shall be attached to the Supreme Council. 
2. The Supreme Council sball form the Commission for every case separately based on 
the nature of the dispute. 
3. If a dispute arises over interpretation or implementation of the Charter and such 
dispute is not resolved within the Ministerial Council or the Supreme Council, the 
Supreme Council may refer such dispute to the Commission for Settlement of Disputes. 
4. The Commission shall submit its recommendation or opinion, as applicable, to the 
Supreme Council for appropriate action. 
ARTICLE ELEVEN, Ministerial CoundI 
1. The Ministerial Council shall be formed of the Foreign Ministers of the member 
states or other delegated Ministers. The Council's presidency shall rotate among 
members every three months by alphabetical order of the states. 
2. The Ministerial Council sball convene every three months and may hold 
extraordinary sessions at the invitation of any member seconded by another member. 
3. The Ministerial Council shall decide the venue of its next session. 
4. A Council's meeting shall be deemed valid if attended by two thirds of the member 
states. 
ARTICLE TWELVE, Functions of the Ministerial CoundJ 
The Ministerial Council's functions shall include the following: 
1. Propose policies, prepare recommendations, studies and projects aimed at 
developing cooperation and coordination between member states in the various fields 
and adopt required resolution or recommendations concerning thereof. 
2. Endeavor to encourage, develop and coordinate activities existing between member 
states in all fields. Resolutions adopted in such matters shall be referred to the 
Ministerial Council for further submission, with recommendations, to the Supreme 
Council for appropriate action. 
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3. Submit recommendations to the Ministers concerned to formulate policies whereby 
the Cooperation Council's resolutions may be put into action. 
4. Encourage means of cooperation and coordination between the various private sector 
activities, develop existing cooperation between the member states' chambers of 
commerce and industry, and encourage the flow of working citizens of the member 
states among them. 
S. Refer any of the various facets of cooperation to one or more technical or specialized 
committees for study and presentation of relevant proposals. 
6. Review proposals related to amendments to this Charter and submit appropriate 
recommendations to the Supreme Council. 
7. Approve the Ministerial Council' 5 Rules of Procedures as well as the Rules of 
Procedures of the Secretariat-General. 
8. Appoint the Assistant Secretaries-General, as nominated by the Secretary-General, 
for a renewable period of three years. 
\	 9. Approve periodic reports as well as internal rules and regulations related to 
administrative and financial affairs proposed by the Secretary-General, and submit 
recommendations to the Supreme Council for approval of the budget of the Secretariat­
General. 
10. Make arrangements for the Supreme Council's meetings and prepare its agenda. 
11. Review matters referred to it by the Supreme Council. 
ARTICLE THIRTEEN, Voting at MInIsterial Coundl 
1. Every member of the Ministerial Council shall have one vote. 
2. Resolutions of the Ministerial Council in substantive matters shall be carried by 
unanimous vote of the member states present and participating in the vote, and in 
procedural matters by majority vote. 
ARTICLE FOURTEEN, Secretariat-GeneraI 
1. The Secretariat-General shall be composed of a Secretary-General who shall be 
assisted by assistants and a number of staff as required. 
2. The Supreme Council shall appoint the Secretary-General, who shall be a citizen of 
one of the Cooperation Council states, for a period of three years which may be 
renewed for one time only. 
3. The Secretary-General shall nominate the Assistant Secretaries-General. 
4. The Secretary-General shall appoint the Secretariat-Generalis staff from among the 
citizens of member states, and may not make exceptions without the approval of the 
Ministerial Council. 
5. The Secretary-General shall be directly responsible for the work of the Secretariat­
General and the smooth flow of work in its various organization. He shall represent 
the Cooperation Council with other parties within the powers vested in him. 
ARTICLE FIFTEEN, Functions of the Secretariat-GeneraI
 
The Secretariat-General shall undertake the following functions:
 
1. Prepare studies related to cooperation and coordination, and to integrated plans and 
programmes for member states' common action. 
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2. Prepare periodic reports on the Cooperation Council's work. 
3. Follow up the execution by the member states of the resolutions and 
recommendations of the Supreme Council and Ministerial Council. 
4. Prepare reports and studies ordered by the Supreme Council or Ministerial Council. 
5. Prepare the draft of administrative and financial regulations commensurate with the 
growth of the Cooperation Council and its expanding responsibilities. 
6. Prepare the Cooperation Council's budget and closing accounts. 
7. Make preparations for meetings and prepare agenda and draft resolutions for the 
Ministerial Council. 
8. Recommend to the Chairman of the Ministerial Council the convocation of an 
extraordinary session of the Council whenever necessary. 
9. Any other tasks entrusted to it by the Supreme Council or Ministerial Council. 
ARTICLE SIXTEEN, The Secretary-General and the Assistant 
Secretaries-General and all the Secretariat-General's staff shall carry out their duties in 
complete independence and in the common interest of the member states. They shall 
refrain from any action or behavior that is incompatible with their duties and from 
divulging the secrets of their jobs either during or after their tenure of office. 
ARTICLE SEVENTEEN, PriviJe&es and Immunities 
1. The Cooperation Council and its organizations shall enjoy on the territories of all 
member states such legal competence, privileges and immunities as required to realize 
their objectives and carry out their functions. 
2. Representatives of the member states of the Council, and the Council's employees, 
shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are specified in agreements to be 
concluded for this purpose between the member states. A special agreement shall 
organize the relation between the Council and the state in which it has its headquarten. 
3. Until such time as the two agreements mentioned in item 2 above are prepared and 
put into effect, the representatives of the member states in the Cooperation Council and 
it staff shall enjoy the diplomatic privileges and immunities established for similar 
organizations. 
ARTICLE EIGHTEEN, Budget of the Secretariat-General 
The Secretariat-General shall have a budget to which the member states shall contribute 
equal amounts. 
ARTICLE NINETEEN, Charter Implementation 
1. This Charter shall go into effect as of the date it is signed by the heads of state of the 
six member states named in this Charter's preamble. 
2. The original copy of this Charter shall be deposited with Saudi Arabia's MinistIy of 
Foreign Affain which shall act as custodian and shall deliver a true copy thereof to 
every member state, pending the establishment of the Secretariat-General at which time 
the latter shall become depository. 
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ARTICLE TWENTY, Amendments to Charter 
1. Any member may request an amendment of this Charter. 
2. Requests for Charter amendments shall be submitted to the Secretary-General who 
sball refer them to the member states at least four months prior to submission to the 
Ministerial Council. 
ARTICLE TWENTY-ONE, Closing Provisions
 
No reservations may be voiced in respect of the provisions of this Charter.
 
ARTICLE TWENTY-TWO
 
The Secretariat-General shall arrange to deposit and register copies of this Charter with
 
the League of Arab States and the United Nations, by resolution of the Ministerial
 
Council.
 
\ 
This Charter is signed on one copy in Arabic language at Abu Dhabi City, United Arab 
Emirates, on 21 Rajab 1401 corresponding to 25 May 1981. 
United Arab Emirates
 
State of Bahrain
 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
 
Sultanate of Oman
 
State of Qatar
 
State of Kuwait
 
59 
-~~-~--- ­
"~, 'I'"~.< 
ENDNOTES 
INTRODUCIJON 
1.	 From the preamble of the Charter of the Cooperation Council for the Arab 
States of the Gulf. See Appendix 1 for the full text of the Charter. 
1JlEMEMBERSTA1ES 
\ 
1.	 Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook 1990 (Detroit, Michigan: 
Gale Research, Inc., 1990), pp. 1097-99. 
2.	 Lacey, Robert, The Kin&dom: Arabia and the House of Sa'ud (New York: 
Avon Books, 1981), pp. 56-58. 
3.	 Mackey, Sandra, The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kin&dom (New York: Signet 
Books, 1990), p. 70. 
4.	 Kelly, J. B., Arabia. the Gulf and the West (London: George Weidenfield and 
Nicolson Limited, 1980), p. 228. 
5.	 Countries of the World, p. 1099. 
6.	 Lacey, Kin&dom, pp. 65-66. 
7.	 Abdrabboh, Bob, Saudi Arabia: Forces of Modernization (Brattleboro, 
Vermont: Amana Books, 1984), pp. 23-24. Nobody is quite sure what will 
happen when the eligible sons run out - no pattern exists for selecting the next 
King other than the naming of the next eldest, capable son of Abdul Ariz as 
Crown Prince. 
8.	 Ibid., p. 74. 
9.	 Countries of the World, pp. 1101-02. 
10.	 See Prospects For Gulf Security, p. 50. 
11.	 Countries of the World, p. 786. 
12.	 Assiri, Abdul-Reda, KuwaitIs Foreip Policy: City-State in World Politics 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p. 9. 
13.	 Crystal, Jill, Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1992), pp. 1-3. 
14.	 Assiri, Kuwait's Foreip Poli~, p. 2. 
15.	 Crystal, Kuwait, pp. 8-11. 
16.	 Assiri, Kuwait's Eorei&n Polic.y, pp. 3-6. 
17.	 Crystal, Kuwait, p. 17. 
18.	 Assiri, KuwaitI s Forei&n Policy, p. 7. 
19.	 Crystal, Kuwait, pp. 26-27. 
60 
20.	 Crystal, Jill, Oil and politics in the Gulf: Rulm and Merebants in Kuwait and 
Qatar (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 90. 
21.	 Crystal, Kuwait, pp. 65-71. 
22.	 Lawson, Fred H., Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocrae.Y (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), p. 1. 
23.	 Countries of the World, pp. 235-37. 
24.	 Lawson, Bahrain, pp. 3-5. 
25.	 Nakhleh, Emile A., Bahrain: Political Deve1Qpment in a Modernizj0a Society 
(Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1976), p. 9. 
26.	 Kelly, Arabia. the Gulf and the West, If." 181 
27.	 Lawson, Bahrain, pp. 48-73. 
28.	 Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Slwjah, Ras al-Khairnah, Fujairah, Umm al-Qaiwaio, and 
Ajmao. 
29.	 Peck, Malcolm C., The United Arab Emirates: A Venture in Unity (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 49-55. 
30.	 Lawson, Bahrain, pp. 74-81. 
31.	 Nakhleh, Bahrain, p. 133. 
32.	 Lawson, Bahrain, pp. 90-91. 
33.	 Countries of the World, p. 1063. 
34.	 Zahlao, Rosemarie Said, The Creation of Qatar (New York: Barnes and Noble 
Books, 1979), p.13. 
35.	 Ibid., p. 42. . 
36.	 Ibid., pp. 53-61. 
37.	 Vine, Peter and Paula Casey, The Herita&e of Qatar (London: IMMEL 
Publishing Limited, 1992), pp. 62-63. 
38.	 See Prospects For Gulf Security, p. 50. 
39.	 Zahlao, Creation of Qatar, pp. 102..()7. 
40.	 Countries of the World, p. 1066. 
41.	 Crystal, Oil and politics, p. 150. 
42.	 Vine and Casey, Heritaae of Qatar, p. 63. 
43.	 Crystal, Oil and politics, pp. 159-60. 
44.	 zah1ao, Creation of Qatar, p. 136. 
45.	 Countries of the World, p. 1299. 
46.	 Peck, United Arab Emirates, p. 6. 
47.	 Countries of the World, p. 1301. 
48.	 Abdullah, Muhammad Morsy, The United Arab Emirates: 
(New York: Barnes &. Noble Books, 1978), pp. 25-26. 
49.	 Countries of the World, p. 1301. 
50.	 Peck, United Arab Emirates, pp. 51-54. 
51.	 Ibid., pp. 121-23. 
52.	 Countries of the World, p. 1302. 
53.	 Ibid., pp. 1304-05. 
54.	 Peck, United Arab Emirates, pp. 62-64. 
55.	 Countries of the World, pp. 989-91. 
61 
A Modem History 
56.	 Allen, Calvin H., Jr., Oman: The Modernization of the Sultanate (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), p. 12. 
57.	 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
58.	 Ibid., p. 37. 
59.	 Ibid., pp. 48-62. 
60.	 Countries of the World, p. 991. 
61.	 Allen, Oman, pp. 64-67. 
62.	 Peterson, J. E. Oman in the Twentieth CentUJ:y: Political Foundations of an 
Emer:ina State (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1978), pp. 59-62. 
63.	 Ibid., pp. 83-85. 
64.	 Peterson, Oman in the Twentieth Century, pp. 211-12. 
65.	 Allen, Oman, p. 85. 
66.	 Countries of the World, p. 993. 
67.	 Allen, oman, p. 123. 
1HE EVOW7ION OF GULF lXJOPERA1JON 
1.	 Troxler, Nancy C., "The Gulf Co-operation Council: The Emergence of an 
Institution," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 16, no. 1, p. 4. 
2.	 Khalaf, 'Abd al-Hadi, "The Elusive Quest for Gulf Security," Middle East 
Rcwort, September-Qctober 1987, p. 19. 
3.	 Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, as reported in Kuwait's Al-Ra'y al-
I Amm. In Nonneman, Gerd, Iraq. the Gulf States & the War (London: Ithaca 
Press, 1986), p. 21. 
4.	 Westwood, J. N., The Riston' of the Middle East Wars (New York: Mallard 
Press, 1991), pp. 187-88. 
5.	 Nonneman, IraQ, p. 31. 
6.	 Ibid., p. 37. 
7.	 Christie, John, "History and Development of the Gulf Cooperation Council: 
A Brief Overview," American-Arab Affairs, Fa1l1986, pp. 2-3. 
8.	 Troxler, "Gulf Co-operation Council," p. 7. 
9.	 Al-Ebraheem, Hassan Ali, Kuwait and the Gulf (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Contemporary Arab Studies, 1984), p. 68. 
10.	 Ibid., p. 69. 
11.	 "GeC: Source of Pride and Prosperity," pp. 8-9. Obtained from the Royal 
Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C. 
12.	 In late 1992, Sheikh Fahim Sultan al-Qasimi, a member of the Bas al-Khaimah 
(in the UAE) royal family, was named the new Secretary-General. Jarrah, 
Najm, "A Dispute Resolved," Middle East International, 8 January 1993, p.12. 
13.	 See Appendix 1. 
14.	 Christie, "History and Development," p. 4. 
15.	 Khalaf, "Elusive Quest," pp. 20-21. 
62
 
7HE GCC 7HROlJGH 1HE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
 
1.	 "Gulf Co-operation Council: Growing Up," The Economist, 13 February 1982, 
p.56. 
2.	 Twinam, Joseph Wright, "Reflections on Gulf Cooperation, With Focus on 
Bahrain, Qatar and Oman," American-Arab Affairs, Fall 1986, p. 28. 
3.	 Khalaf, 'Abd al-Hadi, "The Elusive Quest for Gulf Security," Middle Bast 
Re.port, September-<>ctober 1987, p. 21. 
4.	 "GeC: Source of Pride and Prosperity," p. 11. Obtained from the Royal 
Embassy of Saudi Arab~ Washington, D.C. 
5.	 Braun, Ursula, "The Gulf Cooperation Council's Security Role," in Pridham, 
B. R., The Arab Gulf and the Arab World (New York: Croom Helm, 1988), 
p. 257. 
6.	 Assiri, Abdul-Reda, Kuwait's FORi&» Polic.y: City-State in World Politics 
./ (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p. 77. 
7.	 Nonneman, Gerd, Iraq, the Gulf States & the War (London: Ithaca Press, 
1986), p. 55. 
8.	 Braun, "Gulf Cooperation Council's Security Role," p. 259. 
9.	 Christie, John, "History and Development of the Gulf Cooperation Council: 
A Brief History," American-Arab Affairs, Fall 1986, p. 8. 
10.	 Wingerter, Rex B., "The Gulf Cooperation Council and American Interests in 
the Gulf," American-Arab Affairs, Spring 1986, p. 24. 
11.	 Khalaf, "Elusive Quest, " p. 21. 
12.	 Nonneman, haq, pp. 67-68 and Ming, Yi, "GeC: Summit Signals Subtle 
Policy Change," Bellini Review, 25 November 1985, p. 11. 
13.	 Khalaf, "Elusive Quest," pp. 21-22. 
14.	 Westwood, J. N., The Histon' of the Middle East Wars (New York: Mallard 
Press, 1992), p. 189. 
15.	 Crystal, Jill, Kuwait, The Transformation of an Oil State (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1992), p. 129. 
16.	 Westwood, HistoI)' of Middle East Wars, p. 190. 
17.	 Crystal, Kuwait, p. 129. 
18.	 Freedman, Lawrence and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: 
Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 9. 
19.	 Al-Mehaimeed, Ali M., "Security and Political Cooperation Among GeC 
States, "Kina Khalid Militao' Academy Quarterly, Summer 1992, p. 11. 
Obtained from the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. 
63
 
1JlE1990-91 GULF WAR
 
1.	 See The Member States, p. 7. 
2.	 Freedman, lawrence and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: 
Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 42-43. 
3.	 Finnie, David H., Shiftina Lines in the Sand: Kuwait's Elusive Frontier With 
IraQ (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 151-53. 
4.	 Crystal, Jill, Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1992), p. 141 
5.	 Finnie, Shiftina Lines, pp. 154-55. 
6.	 Crystal, Kuwait, p. 141. 
7.	 Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, pp. 45-46. 
8.	 Crystal, Kuwait, p. 143. 
9.	 An excellent first-hand account of Hussein's personality and its impact on Iraq's 
domestic and foreign policy appears in Al-Kahlil, Samir, Republic of Fear; The 
Inside Story of Saddam's Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990). 
10.	 Crystal, Kuwait, p. 144. 
11.	 Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, pp. 67-68. 
12.	 "GeC Summit Meeting Discusses Arabian Gulf Crisis," Saudi Arab~ January 
1991, p. 1. Obtained from the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. 
13.	 Ibid., p. 2. . 
14.	 Walker, Tony, "The Middle East: Gulf Council has its cosy illusions of unity 
shattered," Financial Times, 14 December 1990, p. 4. 
15.	 "GeC Foreign, Information and Finance Ministers Meet in Riyadh to Discuss 
Arabian Gulf War," Saudi Arabia, February 1991, p. 2. Obtained from the 
Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. 
16.	 The United States at the time had no large bases in the Gulf and was logistically 
unable to stop the Iraqi invasion or respond to it immediately. See Freedman 
and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, p. 67. 
17.	 Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, pp. 93-95. 
18.	 Westwood, History of Middle Bast Wars, p. 198. 
19.	 Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, pp. 233-34. 
20.	 Westwood, History of Middle East Wars, p. 200. 
21.	 Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, pp. 402-03. 
22.	 Westwood, History of Middle East Wars, p. 206. 
1JlE IMPACIS OF 1JlE GUlF WAR 
1.	 Crystal, Jill, Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1992), p. 162. 
2.	 Twinam, Joseph Wright, "The Gulf Cooperation Council Since the Gulf War: 
The State of the States," Middle East Polic.y (Vol. I, 1992, No.4), p. 98. 
64 
3.	 Crystal, Kuwait, p. 164. 
4.	 Ibid., p. 167. 
5.	 Twinam, "Gulf Cooperation Council," p. 102. 
6.	 See The 1990-91 Gulf War, p. 37. 
6.	 Twinam, "Gulf Cooperation Council," p. 100. 
7.	 Crystal, Kuwait, p. 173. 
8.	 Twinam, "Gulf Cooperation Council," pp. 113-15. 
9.	 Ibrahim, Youssef M., "54 Qatari Citizens Petition Emir for Free Elections," 
The New York Times, 13 May 1992, p. 15. 
10.	 Gutman, Roy, "Egypt and Syria to Guard 6 Gulf States," Newsday, 6 March 
1991, p. 15. 
11.	 AJ-Arabi Magazine/Kuwaiti Ministry of Information, Kuwait On the March 
(Kuwait: Kuwaiti Ministry of Information, 1989), p. 228. Obtained from the 
Embassy of the State of Kuwait. 
12.	 See The Gee Through the Iran-Iraq War, p. 27. 
PROSPECISJiVR GUlFSECURITY 
1.	 From a written response to a questionnaire sent to the Embassy of the Sultanate 
of Oman. 
2.	 "Thirteenth GCC Summit Held in Abu Dhabi," Saudi Arabia, February 1993, 
p. 1. Obtained from the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. 
3.	 Nicholson, Mark, "Iran and DAB Seek to Defuse Island Dispute," Financial 
Times, 24 September 1992, p. 7. 
4.	 Hedges, Chris, "Iran Is Riling Its Gulf Neighbon, Pressing Claim to 3 Disputed 
Isles," The New York Times, 13 September 1992, p. 22. 
5.	 Richards, Charles, "Tehran Softens Stance on Gulf Island Dispute," The 
Independent, 25 November 1992, p. 14. 
6.	 "Saudi-Qatari Border Incident," The New York Times, 1 October 1992, p. 8. 
7.	 "Kuwait in Bid to Defuse Qatar-Saudi Border Row," A&eJlCe France Presse, 
3 October 1992. 
8.	 Jarrah, Najm, "A Dispute Resolved," Middle East International, 8 January 
1993, p. 12. 
9.	 Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook; 1.990 (Detroit: Gale 
Research, Inc., 1990), p. 1064. 
10.	 Azmeh, Youssef, "Qatar Boycott Dents Credibility of Gulf Alliance," The... 
Reuter LiImuy Report, 23 November 1992. 
65
 
BmLIOGRAPHY
 
Abdrabboh, Bob. Saudi Arabia: Forces of MncJemirntion. Brattleboro, Vermont: 
Amana Books, 1984. 
Abdullah, Muhammad Morsy. The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History. New 
York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1978. 
AI-Arabi Magazine/Kuwaiti Ministry of Information. Kuwait On the March. Kuwait: 
Kuwaiti Ministry of Information, 1989. 
AI-Ebraheem, Hassan Ali. Kuwait and the Gulf. Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Contemporary Arab Studies, 1984. 
Al-Khalil, Samir. RCWublic of Fear; The Inside sm of 5addam's Iraq. New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1990. 
Al-Mehaimeed, Ali M., "Security and Political Cooperation Among GeC States," 
Kina Khalid Milit;u:y Academy Quarterly (Summer 1992). Obtained from the 
Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. 
Allen, Calvin H., Jr. Oman: The Modernization of the Sultanate. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1987. 
Assiri, Abdul-Reda. Kuwait'S Foreian Policy: City-State in World Politics. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1990. 
Azmeh, Youssef, "Qatar Boycott Dents Credibility of Gulf Alliance," The Reuter 
Library Report (23 November 1992). 
Braun, Ursula, "The Gulf Cooperation Council's Security Role." In Pridham, B. R., 
ed. The Arab Gulf and the Arab World. New York: Croom Helm, 1988. 
Christie, John, "History and Development of the Gulf Cooperation Council: A Brief 
Overview," American-Arab Affairs (Fall 1986). 
Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook 1990. Detroit, Michigan: Gale 
Research, Inc., 1990. 
Crystal, Jill. Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1992. 
----. Oil and politics in the Gulf: Rulers and merchants in Kuwait and Qatar. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman. Written Response to Author's Questionnaire. 
Finnie, David H. Shiftina Lines in the Sand: Kuwait's Elusive frontier With Iraq. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992. 
Freedman, lawrence and Efraim Karsh. The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy 
and War in the New World Order. Princeton, New Jersey:: Princeton 
University Press, 1993. 
"GCC Foreign, Information and Finance Ministers Meet in Riyadh to Discuss Arabian 
Gulf War, Saudi Arabia (February 1991). Obtained from the Royal Embassy of 
Saudi Arabia. 
"GeC: Source of Pride and Prosperity." Obtained from the Royal Embassy of Saudi 
Arabia. 
66 
"GCC Summit Meeting Discusses Arabian Gulf Crisis, Saudi Arabia (January 1991). 
Obtained from the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. 
"Gulf Co-operation Council: Growing Up," The Economist (13 February 1982). 
Gutman, Roy, "Egypt and Syria to Guard 6 Gulf States," Newsday (6 March 1991). 
Hedges, Chris, "Iran Is Riling Its Gulf Neighbors, Pressing Claim to 3 Disputed Isles, " 
The New York Times (13 September 1992). 
Ibrahim, Youssef M., "54 Qatar Citizens Petition Emir for Free Elections," The New 
York Times (13 May 1992). 
Jarrah, Najm, "A Dispute Resolved," Middle East International (8 January 1993). 
Kelly, J. B. Arabia. the Gulf and the West. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1980. 
Khalaf, 'Abel al-Hadi, "The Elusive Quest for Gulf Security," Middle East Re.port 
(September-Qctober 1987). 
"Kuwait in Bid to Defuse Qatar-Saudi Border Row," Apnce France Presse, (3 October 
1992). 
Lawson, Fred H. Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocrae.y. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1989. 
Lacey, Robert. The Ki"l~dom: Arabia and the House of Sa'OO. New York: Avon 
Books, 1983. 
Mackey, Sandra. The Saudis: Inside the Desert KinWm. New York: Signet Books, 
1990. 
Ming, Yi, "GeC: Summit Signals Subtle Policy Change," Beijina Review (25 
November 1985). 
Nakhleh, Emile A. Bahrain: Political DevelQPment in a Modemizina Society. 
Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1976. 
Nicholson, Mark, "Iran and UAE Seek to Defuse Island Dispute," Financial Times 
(24 September 1992). 
Nonneman, Gerd. Iraq. the Gulf States & the War. London: Ithaca Press, 1986. 
Peck, Malcolm C. The United Arab Emirates: A Venture in Unity. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1986. 
Peterson, J.E. Oman in the Twentieth Century: Political Foundations of an Emeraina 
~. New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1978. 
Richards, Charles, "Tehran Softens Stance on Gulf Island Dispute," The Independent 
(25 November 1992). 
"Saudi-Qatari Border Incident," The New York Times (1 October 1992). 
"Thirteenth GeC Summit Held in Abu Dhabi," Saudi Arabia (February 1993). 
Obtained from the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. 
Troxler, Nancy C., "The Gulf Co-operation Council: The Emergence of an 
Institution,"Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 16, No.1). 
Twinam, Joseph Wright, "The Gulf Cooperation Council Since the Gulf War. The 
State of the States," Middle East Policy (Vol. I, 1992, No.4). 
Twinam, Joseph Wright, "Reflections on Gulf Cooperation, With Focus on Bahrain, 
Qatar and Oman." American-Arab Affairs (Fall 1986). 
Vine, Peter and Paula Casey. The HeritaiC of Qatar. London: IMMEL Publishing 
Limited, 1992. 
67 
Walker, Tony, "The Middle East; Gulf Council has its cozy illusions of unity 
shattered,"Fmancial Times (14 December 1990). 
Westwood, J. N. The History of the Middle East Wars. New York: Mallard Press, 
1991. 
Wingerter, Rex B., "The Gulf Cooperation Council and American Interests in the 
Gulf,"American-Arab Affairs (Spring 1986). 
zahlan, Rosemarie Said. The Creation of Qatar. New Yark: Barnes and Noble 
Books, 1979. 
68
 
GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL QUESTIONNAIRE 
PLEASE ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS AS FULLY AS POSSmLE. ATTACH
 
SEPARATE SHEETS IF NECESSARY. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND
 
ASSISTANCE IN HELPING WITH THIS PROJECT.
 
1.	 What role does the State ofKuwait expect the Gulf Cooperation Council to play in 
regional mediation efforts, such as the Palestinian issue? 
2a. Does the state ofKuwait support further integration of the Arabian Gulf states within the 
GeC framework? yes no _ 
b. Would Kuwait support the addition of further members to the GeC, such as Iraq or 
Yemen, in the future? 
3. Does Kuwait view the GeC as becoming a true regional defense organization, or will 
outside assistance continue to be needed in the case of external aggression? 
4. What effect did last year's border clash between Saudi Arabia and Qatar have upon 
Kuwait's view ofthe long-tenn viability ofthe GeC? 
5.	 Will the traditional distrust and border disputes between many of the GeC member states 
prevent the development ofany effective joint defense force? 
PLEASE MAIL THE COMPLETED PAGES TO THE FOLWWING ADDRESS: 
DAVID MICHAEL PRIESS 
323 ROBERT DRIVE 
NORMAL, IL 61761 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP WITH THIS STUDY. 
